The tension was highest in places where the executive staff of the mills lived. One such pocket with a high density of textile technocrats was in Prabhadevi on a by-lane, off Veer Savarkar Marg, leading to the sea. In an area not more than an acre, stood the twin towers of Bombay Dyeing and two sprawling housing societies called 'Technocrat' and 'T extila ' .Hundreds of the highly paid technical  experts and managers of textile mills lived in these colonies. In the adjacent lane was a sea-side bungalow hidden behind carefully planted trees where  the owner of Bombay Dyeing -Mohammed Ali Jinnah's grandson, Nusli Wadia -lived. The residents of this neighbourhood feared that gangs of millworkers would soon be heading this way and there was no knowing how they may give vent to their anger. When one day a group of belligerent looking  workers actually arrived at Technocrat shouting slogans, there was panic among the residents. But the agitated workers wished only to see one of the mill-managers living there and they left peacefully after meeting the official. This isolated and harmless incident illustrated th.e paranoia which coloured  the middle class perception of the strike and was " responsible for a strong negative "emotional response to it and the workers. 

The millowners made the most of the sympathy which was therefore showered upon them by the city's elite and gradually shifted their own attention to the possible benefits of the strike. In this context they naturally had neither the inclination nor the means to understand the nature and dimensions of the strike and the human tragedy it signified. Their total failure to grasp the dynamics of the situation was illustrated by the fact that when they met the Union Commerce Minister in April 1982, they asked for police protection claiming that if this were provided the workers 'would return to the mills. Simultaneously, the government was receiving intelligence reports exactly to the contrary. But this changed nothing for the MOA and its chairman was of the view that "the long drawn 
fear-stricken strike of the workmen (is) led by an irresponsible labour leader who has no respect for law or the rules of the civilized society and whose cult of labour relations is violence."1 Neither the unprecedented length of the strike nor the level of solidarity among the workers could change this view. Samant's defeat in.the Thane Lok Sabha by election gave more streng.th to this line of reasoning. R.L.N.Vijaynagar, secretary of MOA, was proclaiming that things would move fast in the months ahead and the strike would fizzle out because the workers' endurance had run out. This could only be cause for celebration since in Vijaynagar's view the strike was "not a worker welfare attempt but a clear fight among labour leaders to gain ascendancy over the workers in Bombay." The chairman of the Housing Development and Finance Corp. (HDFC) and former chairman of Industrial Credit and Investmen! Corpora!ioh of India, H.T.Parekh, noted with satisfaction that in the workers' returning to their villages and possibly not coming back to the city was: an opportunity to deal with the excess labour situation. As Iate as October 1982 Parekh wrote in the Economic Times: "To a layman Dr. Samant's demand and the offer by the industry both seem unrealistic. Both sides should put forward their revised minimum and maximum to reach a quick settlement which they have not done. Once the gap is narrowed, a mediator acceptable to both can determine a reasonable figure after a quick discussion with both parties." 

Such views, common among the top ranks of industrialists and chiefs of financial institutions, were not only ill-informed but also reflected a certain naiviety because they ignored the issue of union recognition. The editor of the Economic Times, Hannan Ezekiel had written a lengthy article on the 
strike entitled Approach to a Solution' without even touching on the issue of RMMS. In a reply to this article B.N.Dattar*, head of the RMMS-sponsored Ambekar Institute of Labour Studies, was compelled to plote that since Ezekiel failed entirely to deal with the question of the BIR Act and RMMS derecognition, his 'Approach to a Solution' suffered from a basic unreality.2 

But the views of these respected opinion-makers were an accurate reflection of the prevalent perception of the strike among the ruling elite. They were willing to acknowledge that the strike had raised certain fundamental issues but the overall perspective remained deeply rooted in tradition and their own class interests, making it impossible for them to understand critical issues from the workers' point of view. Therefore, the strike leadership's lack of respect  for "constructive and constitutional" methods was frequently denounced without attempting to examine the extent to which the credibility of the system they sought to protect had been eroded at the grassroots. Thus Ezekiel could in all seriousness suggest retraining schemes for workers squeezed out of the industry due to modernisation and retrenchment, without. realising that such 'schemes' have absolutely no credibility with the workers. 

Such thinking could only produce an offer which the workers would find ludicrous. On July 9, just as the strike approached the six-month mark, Labour Minister Bhagwat Jha Azad answered a calling attention notice on the strike in Parliament. Noting the "hardships suffered by the workers" Azad 

announced a Rs.30 ad hoc wage increase, a Rs.650 advance (to be later deducted from wages over a period of time), a tripartite panel to examine the textile industry's problems and an assurance that workers who immediately returned to the mills would not be victimised. The Tripartite Committee's brief was to look into the problems of badli workers, the demand of workmen for house rent allowance and conveyance allowance among other things. There was, of course, no mention of the workers' principle and most fundamental demand - derecognition of the RMMS. 

Opposition MPs raised token protests against the offer made by the Labour Minister calling it 'unfair'. Since the offer had been formulated in consultation with the MOA it welcomed the announ- cement and expressed the hope that workers would soon resume duties.* To the workers the offer was as much of a blow as it was a consolidating force. What Samant described as "the most dishonourable offer and package, which humiliates the self-respecting workers" was a shock because it belied their hope that a prolonged strike would force the government to relent. Strike activists almost unanimously rejected the offer and it reinforced their determination to continue the struggle. For the offer was seen as adding insult to injury. 

Therefore, Samant began planning a chain of strikes in Maharashtra as part of a campaign to 

intensify the textile strike. Samant told Kumar Ketkar of Economic Times on September 21, that the struggle would now be spread horizontally since it was clear after a marathon debate in the Maharashtra Assembly that the government was making the strike a prestige issue and would not accept the legitimacy of the workers' demands unless forced to see reality.4 The labour scene in and around Bombay, suddenly seemed even more volatile when, at the same time, George Fernandes prepared to launch a strike of municipal employees. A week earlier, in Delhi, all the non-INTUC unions had boycotted the National Labour Conference and had pledged to give greater momentum to their 'total confrontation' with the Government. For the millowners this 'confrontation' was crucial because they saw it as a change to destroy the 'Samant menace'. Even as the losses continued to accumulate the " millowners lost what little interest they once had in resolv ing the conflict and settling the strike. And the losses were indeed stupendous. By the middle of November, 1982, the mills had lost production worth Rs.1,030 crores, profits of Rs.40 crores an.d exports worth Rs.100 crores. The workers had by then lost Rs.205 crores in wages over 44 million mandays. The state and central governments had lost Rs.205 crores in revenue. 

The total production of mill-made cloth in the country was 837 million metres less in the first nine months of 1982 as compared to the corresponding period in 1981. Mill-made cloth production at textile centres other than Bombay went down by 20 million metres during January-September 1982. Ahmedabad was particularly affected because of  the 50% power cuts. As against this, the Textile Commissioner's Office had made a provisional estimate that the decentralised sector had increased 
cloth production by 265 million metres in the first rune months of 1982. However, the total cloth production In the country was still lower by about 570 million metres in October 1982. Yet there was no cloth shortage and the piled-up stock position of textile centres other than Bombay did not substantially improve. The quantum of piled-up stocks of cloth at other centres went down only from 264.6 million metres in January 1982 to 237.3 mll.1Ion metres In September that year. And this was higher than the correspondIng month In 1981 when stocks stood at 224.5 million metres. It became apparent, as ear ly as March 1982 that other mills were not benefittIng from the strike and the positive fallout of the strike was going to the powerlooms. Not only did the powerloom sector take advantage of the strike on its own initiative, but it was also helped by some of the strike-struck mills. Many of the leading mills had cloth produced on powerlooms and then marketed wltb the mill stamp, in order to keep the mill's brand-name alive. 

Consequently there was no cloth shortage in the market. The ancillary and accessory manufacturers' supplying to the Bombay textile mills found alternative markets and did not suffer great losses. While the figures of losses incurred by mills continued to rise astronomically, the millowners themselves were not affected since these losses did not impinge on their personal fortunes in any visible manner. Thus while the interim offer of Rs.30 was welcomed by the millowners, the Tripartite Committee was dismissed by them as being unnecessary  the Committee's job was to examIne problems of the textile industry's workers, which did not Interest most millowners. Others more sympathetic to the workers' cause also doubted the credibility of this COmmittee because it indicated only that the 
Government was keen to create an impression of wanting to resolve the strike. The appointment of he Committee in no way indicated a change in he Government's basic attitude towards the strike md thus could not be an instrument for breaking the stalemate. 

However, the former chief justice of Maharashtra, Justice Deshpande, who was selected to head the committee, insisted later that at the time of appointing the committee the then commerce minister Shivraj Patil "sincerely thought a way out of the stalemate could be found by examining the whole industry and seeing how rationalisation could bring higher wages -he was dead earnest." Senior officials in the commerce ministry echoed these entiments and stressed the need for obtaining an objective view of the situation. But more than that it was hoped by officials that the committee would eventually provide an opening for a compromise settlement which would end the strike. But the committee did not exist in a vacuum. It worked in the same, deeply vitiated atmosphere which had generated the stalemate of the strike. The governments' refusal to allow Samant to be represented On the committee further reduced the possibility of it being able to offer a solution acceptable to the workers. Out of the three unions invited to participate only the RMMS and the Textile Workers' Association in Ahmedabad took part in the committee's proceedings. Other unions boycotted the committee. 

The millowners went to the committee with the determination of only presenting old arguments and claims about their inability to pay higher wages, still unwilling to concede any benefits. Thus the proceedings of the committee, which commenced almost five months after it was appointed, were plagued by dissensions and the inability of various representatives to come to an agreement. The committee eventually made recommendations only on the issues of house rent allowance (HRA) and bad1i workers. After much wrangling it decided to grant the workers an HRA ranging from Rs.32 to Rs.65.5 On the badli front there was no unanimity but the committee tentatively formulated a system which would make a segment of these workers permanent but at the same time also create an addillonal category of 'reservists'.6 These semi-permanent workers would not enjoy all the benefits and protectjons of permanent workers but they would be entjtled to dajly employment. The committee could not reach an agreement on the issue of a wage increase. But in this case even the representative of the Maharashtra government lodged a dissenting vote and agreed with the trade unjons that there was some scope for increasing the wage over and above the standing offer of the Rs.30 interim increase. While Justice Deshpande later refused to discuss the details of the report, which never having been formally accepted by the government was not released to the public, he broadly discussed the issue in these terms "The workers were feeljng the pinch of the cost of living. But money must come from the profits of a concern. For almost two years there was no production but maintenance costs were borne by the mill- owners. If the cost of living increased so did the cost of raw materials and can the industry raise the price of cloth proportionately? There is a limit upto which the price of cloth can be hiked. So where from to pay?" 

This was the basic thrust of the committee's proceedings and it came as a surprise to no one. By the end of August 1983, it was clear that even the Central Government had lost interest in the committee and did not reply to its requests for clarification and other information. Therefore, though they had not been formally informed, the committee members knew when they met on September 8, 1983 that it would be their last meeting the committee has been initially given a term of one year and the government clearly had no intention of extending the term. Moreover, given the pace of work and total lack of unanimity, Justice Deshpande was himself of the view that nothing was to be gained by the continued wrangling. Moreover, as Justice Deshpande pointed out, with only two out of the required five union representatives in the committee, what validity could its report have similar views prevailed at the Commerce Minlstry in Delhi where the decision to wind up the committee was taken. Given the progress of the report, officials felt, there was no point in Investing further time and money to deal with the larger questions about the textile industry in India, which was originally apart of the committee's brief. 

Senior officials at the Commerce Ministry took the same view as Justice Deshpande, that higher wages would mean greater sickness of the mills. But the more candid among the Udyog Bhavan bureaucrats went a step further and pointed out how "the strike played into their (MOA's) hands. It would have been better to have a constructive dialogue with the workers to settle the production lorms etc. In the absence of that there is now forced rationalisation." Though it took some time for the government officials and millowners to openly and jubilantly talk about the benefits of the strike, they had been conscious of the possible dividends after the first few months of the strike. 

Having overcome their Surprise at the prolonged juratIon of the strike, t.he millowners were viewing It with a tinge of optimism.. The strike was creating conditions whjch could help the Industry in the long run. As Ashok Piramal, Chairman of Morarjee Goculdas Spinning and Weaving Mills, told shareholders at the company's annual general meeting held on December 7, 1982: "The prolonged enforced closure has also given our management an opportunity to make a detailed appraisal of the working of the mill as also to chalk out strategies for the future... we had drawn up a plan for modernisation of our mills involving a capital outlay of over Rs.15 crores by end 1981. I am pleased to state that despite the great constraints faced .In the last twelve months, we have taken vigorous steps in forging ahead in this direction... Secondly, co-terminus with, modernisation every effort must be made to improve productivity in all areas or else it would totally negate the massive capital outlay. While this is a sensitive issue It is high time that all concerned the managements, the unions, the employees and government -took a dispassionate and objective view of what is in the long-term interest of this vital national industry with an international dimension."7 This was Piramal's euphemistic way of saying that the strike provided an opportunity to retrench workers on a scale that in normal course would have taken over a decade. 

A director of Bombay, Dyeing said in January 1983: "We (the Bombay textile mills) were over- burdened wIth labour. Now at least 25% of them are not expected to come back and replacements will not be taken. This is a big saving for the mills which will now not have to pay retrenchment benefits or compensation. The closure of certain mills will also clean up the industry and place less of a burden on the banks that kept them going." It was by then, openly acknowledged that about 35,000 to 40,000 workers, and the 50,000 badlis, would eventually be left out on the streets with no recourse to enforce their right to work in the mills. 

The strike which millowners had predicted, at the very outset, would destroy the sick mills was proving to be an instrument of modernisation and nationalisation. By the time the strike completed one year, the millowners were convinced that top bureaucrats of the Commerce" Ministry shared 
and endorsed their view that some mills must be allowed to die a natural death to enhance the future of the remaining mills. By the end of the financial year in March 1983, this was widely perceived to be the joint strategy of the industry and government. The owners, of both healthy and marginally sick mills, were well satisfied with this situation since they were confident that nationalised banks would eventually allocate special funds to modernise the better mills and to nurse the sick ones. Owners of mills considered to be a total write-off were equally confident that once an appropriate period had elapsed, and the unions' uproar had been contained, the government would allow them to close down the mills, sell the land and move out of the city to set up modern units in areas where the cost of labour, power, water and other basic infrastructure would be much lower. "You may lose 3,000 jobs in tbe city but you will create 30,000 jobs elsewhere" said one prosperous millowner. While these figures were exaggerated this point was also made by Labour Secretary Deshmukh. "Having 50,000 people walking in a morcha in major cities means nothing," Deshmukh said. "What is so special about the Bombay workers?" Essentially Deshmukh argued that there was little justification for sinking further resources into protecting already 'privileged' urban workers. The Asiad argument of  over-expenditure in urban centres should also be made with regard to labour, the secretary said forcefully. 

Such talk confirmed the government's 'get tough' policy on the labour front and convinced millowners that the non-viable units would be allowed to die and others would be given liberal financial aid. The Reserve Bank of India had categorised the mills from 'A' to 'C', using the financial health of the mills as a criterion. The mills in category 'A' were profitable before and after the strike. The 'B' mills were marginally profitable before the strike but sick afterwards. The 'C"  mills were either already sick or on the verge of sickness when the strike began and were not expected to be viable after the strike. 

Even when bureaucrats gradually began. talking lbout the 'political necessity of not allowing the mills to die,' there were only limited apprehensions in Bombay. This. changed when commerce minister V.P.Singh announced during a press conference at Bombay in late August 1983, that the government had decided' in principle' to take over the mills in category 'C'. This announcement triggered off an intensive round o f lobbying in which millowners whose mills fell in category 'C' tried to make a case for the exemption of their mill from being taken over by the Government. A 'takeover' would kill the grand plans of closing down the mills and selling the land or just selling the surplus land on the mill compound in order to make handsome monetary gains. Vasantdada Patil and his wife Shalini made- personal promises to at least one millowner that they would ensure his mill was exempted from the 'takeover'. Pranab Mukherjee was also perceived as being sympathetic to the millowners' point of view. 

By mid-October some of the millowners whose units fell in category 'C' were certain that their mills would not be taken over. Thus the takeover of 'C' category mills by an ordinance of the union government was a rude shock to some millowners* and broadly condemned by their fraternity as a 'stab in the back.'** The National Textile Corporation's (NTC) accumulated losses of Rs.500 crores were paraded before the public by the deflated and irate millowners. They were also quick to point out that apart from the 13 mills takeover, another 17 NT C mills all over the country were not functioning. What purpose could such a takeover serve, the owners asked, except that of being an ill- conceived populist gesture. 

On the other hand there would have been no justification for giving further finance from nationalised banks to managements which had failed to run the units succ~ssfully and in many cases deliberatedly made them sick. The Industrial Development Bank of India (IDBI) report on the sick textile mills in fact concluded that even a relief package contemplated by the financial institutions would be 

**Arvind Lalbhai, president of ICMF, proclaimed the takeover to be a 'rude shock.' 

 insufficient for the category 'C' mills. Commerce Ministry decision makers had therefore concluded that the sale of land was indeed the only way of financing the restoration of the mills' health. However, the sale of land and its end use in central Bombay is a highly contentious issue. A senior commerce ministry official maintained that there would be no way of monitoring the sale of the land, its price and end use if the land remained under the control of the millown"ers. This was offered as one of the primary considerations in the decision to take over the mills and eventually nationalise the units.What was not mentioned in the corridors of Udyog Bhavan but was openly discussed in political circles was the rumour that the Congress(1) had taken over Rs.50 crores from the real estate kings of Bombay as bribes for the eventual sale of the surplus land of mills taken over by the Government. The rumour was never confirmed. 

The takeover, though a major drama of the strike, did not occur till October 1983, when the strike was effectively over. Having examined the perceptions and preoccupations of the mill-owners it is now important to return to the dark, congested realm of the chawls and bastis from where the war was being waged in 1982. 

When the strike remained essentially peaceful till the seventh month, the middle class apprehensions about large scale violence also slowly receded into the background. So when Samant and about 8,000 textile workers decided to court arrest on August 16, 1982, to the man on the street it meant only a minor traffic jam in the heart of south Bombay at rush hour and was worth a small news item in the next day's newspaper. There was nothing in this to touch the lives, or excite the interests of the elite. But only two days later the lull was shattered by an explosion of violence which brought the army out on the streets of Bombay for the first time since Independence.