At Worli Naka, and in the by-lanes around it which led to the mill areas, all hell had broken loose. Amid the sound of breaking glass and lusty slogan-shouting it seemed as though Kamble's  bada kranti was finally at hand. Had the hitherto placid textile workers finally gone on the war path?   And if so, what was the immediate provocation for this outburst? A day earlIer the girni kamgar had peacefully courted arrest in the best tradition f non-violent civil disobedience. The fuse had, in fact, blown elsewhere but till the next day's news- papers made it clear, most of the city under siege would believe that the violence was an inevitable outcome of two and a half lakh workers remaining on strike for six months. Certainly, textile workers had apart in what followed over the next three days but they did not initiate the violence. 

An explosive situation had prevailed in the police force over several months as a newly formed union of police constables pressed for its demands to be met. In the early morning hours of August 18 the Maharashtra government itself detonated the bomb. In a well-planned and secretively executed operation, the government arrested S.D.Mohite and 22 other leading activists of the Maharashtra. Police Karamchari Sanghatana, which had staged a black badge demonstration on Independence day. Extra reinforcements of the Central Reserve Police and the Border Security Force had been brought into the city earlier under the pretext of handling the textile workers' jail bharo campaign. These forces were Instead used to take control of the Nalgaum Armed Constabulary and ensure that the local constables were unarmed. The keys of the armoury were taken away from the police at gun point by BSF jawans. On hearing about the arrest of their leaders the policemen gathered in groups at BDD chawls, adjacent to Worli Naka, where many of them lived. Within hours they had spontaneously launched a raIl and rasta roko agitation. Textile workers, who form a sizeable segment of the BDD chawls population were also swept up in the angry outburst that followed. 
 

At another point, a maidan near Lower Parel railway station, a meeting of textile workers was in progress. When they saw that the trains had stopped and realised what had happened the workers joined the rasta roko and began throwing stones at buses, cars and taxis. In the frenzy of violence which followed, a section of the crowd headed for Morarji Mills No.3, broke into the premises, pulled out some files and furniture and set them on fire. The police chowky installed at the mill gate since the strike began, was also completely gutted. Another group of textile workers went along with the constables in a morcha from Jambori Maidan via Worli Naka to Nana Chowk. All over the city, policemen and textile workers combined to go on a rampage in which lumpen elements had a field day. The show-room of Century Bazar, where the Century Mills' office IS located, was looted by hundreds of men, women and children. The State Government was compelled to call in the Army -which had never been needed to quell civil disturbance in Bombay, since Independence. For the next three days the city intermittently remained under curfew. At the end of the first day alone at least four people lay dead and 120 were in hospital with bullet injuries. About 24 BEST buses were burnt, and 450 other buses damaged. The BEST ,estimated damages exceeding Rs. 1 crore. The Central Railway estimated damages of Rs.16 lakhs. And it had all been triggered off by the Government's 'firm stand' on yet another militant union action. 

The Maharashtra Police Karamchari Sanghatana, formed about a year earlier, had been pressing for certain basic demands. The body wanted government registration, promotion for constables to the post of head constable after 15 years of service according to seniority, immediate implementation of government scheme for providing subsidised food grains to policemen, housing, free education for their children, and implementation of government orders regarding the grant of refreshment allowances, D.A. etc. As in the textile strike, the crucial issue for the government was not the actual demands but the militancy of the policemen and how it could be curbed. This helped to forge a link (however temporary) between traditional enemies -the instruments of state terror and the proletariat..* l 

The frustration of the textile workers seemed to merge with the wrath of policemen and erupt in unison. The textile workers had struck work for six months before the Central Government made any offer for a settlement and appointed a committee to examine some of their demands. The policemen had waited for a year and obtained no results. When they took to the streets -shocking not only the city but the whole country -the Chief Minister immediately announced, in a television broadcast, that a special committee headed by the, Inspector General of Police would examine their demands. This left many of the striking workers wondering if they had erred by remaining peaceful. 

But the government's attitude towards the constables and their 'Sanghatana' remained unchanged. Chief Minister Babasaheb Bhosale categorically ruled out any talks with the outlawed Sanghatana even while he assured cabinet colleagues that the agitating policemen would not be victimised. The failure to understand the deep-rooted causes of such uprisings was so complete that many bureaucrats resorted to a conspiracy theory in attempting to explain the unprecedented street violence and disruption of life in Bombay. 
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* However, this was not true of the rural areas  where  the unrest had distinctly anti-police implications.  In Dhulia, thousands of men and women and children were reported to have stoned the main police chowky 

Bhosale went so far as to openly suggest that the Sanghatana had grown in power as a result of the 'money power' secured from 'somebody' last January. This was an obvious reference to donations granted to the Sanghatana by the then Chief Minister A.R.Antulay, from the Chief Minister's fund, just before he resigned from office. It was convenient to attribute such staggering, uncontrollable mass actions to a conspiracy. Conspiracies the bureaucracy could handle but genuine mass action was beyond its scope of experience. The response of the mainstream media was once again predictable: "... the Bombay bandh on Thursday bears comparison in sheer irresponsibility y with the railway strike amidst food shortages in large parts of the country in 1974. Mrs. Gandhi did not shrink from her duty then. She must not shrink from it now..."1 wrote Girilal Jain in the Times of India. 

The scale and nature of violence ruled out the state administration's claim that the city's lumpen elements had simply grabbed the opportunity to go on a rampage m a temporarily unpoliced city. Certainly, 'the lumpen elements had a field day but the looting and ransacking had too distinct a pattern to have been the work of criminals alone. Food grain stores were a primary target in the mill areas. As one worker was reported to have said: 'Nine months we went hungry -you don't expect us to loot TV sets." While money lenders, symbols of exploitation and objects of hate, were another popular target, adjoining shops with valuables were left untouched. The only houses to be attacked were those of Bhal Bhosale, General Secretary of the RMMS; Vasant Hoshing, President of RMMS and Bhaurao Paul, M.L.A. and a mafIa don-like figure. All three men were despised and hated with a passion which was obvious from the ruthless manner in which their houses were ransacked. It was clear that these homes were specific targets because adjoining flats were left untouched. But in the homes of those the workers perceived to be their tormentors, every piece of glass was smashed, television sets and other goods were thrown out of the window. In Bhal Bhosale's house the mob decamped with a cassette deck, furniture and a fan from the balcony. In the large bazaar close to Bhosale's house, the only shop to be touched was a co-operative society stocking grains and other food items. Similarly, while private cars and other vehicles were targets for destruction, pedestrians were not disturbed and even helped. The August riots were not a revolutionary insurrection, but trey could not be dismissed merely as a riot by anti-social elements. 

Samant had, from the very outset, adopted a policy of avoiding violent confrontation between the striking textile workers and the state. Much of the rank and file was, m fact, unhappy with Doctor's tame attitude. Individual groups of young textile workers had, thus, independently planned and executed violent actions and counter-actions against RMMS functionaries and 'black legs'. The most celebrated case had been the petrol bomb attack on 'loyal' workers of Sriram Mills (mentioned in Chapter 7). Samant may not have publicly condemned such actions but he privately discouraged them on the grounds that any sustained violent confrontation with the State would only invite repression of the sort. which ,workers would find intolerable and that would prove counter-productive to keeping the strike alive. Thus Doctor was quick to tell all reporters who contacted him on that chaotic August morning that he had nothing to do with the violent eruptions in the city. 

The activists of the area and the' zone committee understood and accepted the workers' need to spontaneously give vent to their frustrations but they were also alive to the continuing animosity between the police and workers. Many a zone committee activist would tell of how he had earlier spent several hours in discussions with policemen, trying' to convince them that they were merely instruments of state oppression and were themselves equally oppressed. But the response of policemen varied from indifference to arrogance, depending on the individual's attachment to his uniform. Those constables who responded favourably to the inculcating efforts of textile workers only expressed their helplessness to act. 

When the riots left the textile workers bearing at least half the blame for the violence, the more shrewd strike activists expressed an intense anger, against the policemen which almost equalled their hatred for the RMMS. The girni kamgar was beIng blamed and oppressed for the three days of violence unleashed by those who habitually maltreated them. With the leadership of the Police Sanghatana in jail and other militant elements similarly dealt with, the rank and file of Bombay's constabulary soon reverted to normal, in terms of its harsh 
treatment of the striking workers. The upcoming Ganesh Chaturti festival, the most significant festival for Maharashtrians, lent an urgency to the process of reorganisation. 

The riots not only created confusion among the rank and file of the textile workers' but also marked a new law for TUJAC members in their hope of making a breakthrough to settle the strike. A month before the police uprising, veteran trade unionist S.M.Joshi had gone to Delhi and met the Prime Minister, in connection with the strike. During the brief audience granted by "her, Mrs. Gandhi told Joshi that she was not averse to discussing a settlement to the strike with anyone, including the TUJAC- Which included Samant. On this basis, the TUJAC passed a resolution on July 17 which called for talks between TUJAC, the MOA and the government. The bottom line for the proposed negotiations, the resolution stated, was the demand to rectify wage disparities between textile workers and their counterparts in other industries, derecognition of the RMMS, immediate scrapping of the BIR Act, recognition of trade unions by secret ballot, permanency for badli workers and monetary relief to workers for the strike period (instead of a mere advance, as earlier offered by the Labour Minister). This resolution was passed even though many TUJAC members were irked by the fact that Mrs. Gandhi had told Joshi that Commerce Minister Shivraj Patil had met Samant. The TUJAC members knew nothing of this meeting and were offended at being left out of such important developments. P.N.Samant, who was present at the meeting, said he was not his brother's keeper and thus did not know of all his meetings. However , P.N.Samant gave his own support to the resolution and the decision that a TUJAC delegation, along with Samant, should go to Delhi and take up the Prime Minister's offer for talks. P.N.Samant gave no promises about his brother's reaction but offered to place the resolution before him and get his reply. 

Since Samant was not in his office throughout that day P.N.Samant did not see him till the evening, at a rally Samant was to address. There was no opportunity for discussion before the meeting and in his speech that evening Samant announed plans for a jail bharo andolan which automatically ruled out any conciliatory action such as going to Delhi with a delegation. The disappointed and angry TUJAC leaders decided to still go ahead with their plans and were given a tentative appointment. But when they tried to confirm the appointment, no reply was forthcoming. Then the police riot of August 18-19 further altered the situation and the meeting with Mrs. Gandhi never materialised. The growing distance between Samant and the TUJAC had been visible even before the riots. On August 15, the TUJAC and Samant held separate protest functions. The jail bharo andolan which Samant launched in August (without consulting TUJAC) had been suggested by TUJAC in May. At that point, in May, Samant had not accepted the idea and said that the agitation could be launched later. Somnath Dube of the Hind Mazdoor Kisan Panchayat was of the view that perhaps Samant's reluctance at that stage was due to his continuing negotiations with Vasantdada Patil for a possible re-entry into the Congress(I). But there is no 
evidence to show that such negotiations took place. 
 

 The final breach in the poorly constructed edifice of the TUJAC came with the clash between Samant and George Fernandes over the BEST and Munlcipal workers' strike. In September, Fernandes called a strike of  civic employees and refused to link it with the textile strike though he had offered to join forces with Samant to 'give the textile strike a broad base and a political orientation.' Thus, when George in turn was trying to fight a hard-pitched battle at BEST, Samant refused to participate in the indefinite struggle.  This conflict occurred in late October just as the textile strike had entered its most vigorous phase. The mills had, by then, begun to take on new workers in an effort to break the strike. At the end of September an official of the MOA, R.G..Shetye, had admitted to Faraz Ahmed of the Indian Express that 30,000 to 40,000 new workers had been recruited m the mills and this was almost half the number of workers inside at that point. While, in admtting this, the MOA was acknowledging the continuing strength of the strikers it was also warning them that if they did not return to work soon, more and more new workers would be hired to replace them. This increased the pressure on Samant to intensify the struggle. Thus, in early October he announced a second jail bharo campaign along with a three day utpadan roko (production bandh) in all units where his unions were in control. On October 11, Samant and 11,000 workers courted arrest and were sent to jail*  The utpadan roko evoked an excellent response and about 3,500 units (approximately 90% of the Units under Samant's control) shut down for three days. 
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*Some of the workers held were taken to Aarey Milk Colony where a volatile situation developed leading to a police firing in which one man was killed. Yashwant Chavan, who had been giving a speech there, was arrested for allegedly inciting the workers. 
 
The State Government responded to this renewed militancy by arresting over 3,500 textile workers and union activists from other units on the eve of the utpadan roko evoked a poor response, the agitation cost Maharashtra a production loss of Rs. 25 crores and half a million mandays over just three days. The workers had, in fact, responded enthusiastically to the jail bharo call and on the first day the police refused to arrest the workers who had proudly proclaimed: "They won't have enough jails to keep us." There were widespread ana severe lathi-charges on the workers. Though the TUJAC played no role in this agitation, the CITU independently issued a statement condemning the lathi-charge on workers peacefully courting arrest. 

But the saddest drama was played at BEST. Fernandes, who had the recognised BEST union, had called for an indefinite strike, while samant had asked his followers m BEST merely to join the three-day utpadan roko. At the end of three days samant's supporters returned to work while Fernandes' supporters remained on strike. Samant's rationale in not continuing the strike was that he had no specific demands and his supporters may later be victimised. P.N.samant explained a year after these events: "George never asked us (to join the strike). Had the strike been complete the management would have talked to Fernandes immediately and he would have settled for a Rs.75 increase. We would not accept that (our strike would have continued) and we would be victimised later." But the actual cause of conflict was the deep personal rivalry and mistrust between samant and Fernandes. Wrote Radha Iyer: "This show of strength union politics, which has been repeated m BEST several times in the past, has cost Dr. samant tremendously in terms of his image. Even the mill workers have been extremely disappointed by his stand. It is clear that Dr. Samant has outplayed his last cards. It the most he can now call for another utpadan roko agitation for an extended period of five or ten days. Beyond that there is nothing for him to do. The mill, workers are getting restive."2 

The workers feeling the mounting tension of a deepening crisis, were pushed closer to desperation by the government's continuing intransigence.  Even in mid-October, after the utpadan roko, Union Commerce Minister Shivraj Patil reiterated that while the government was keen to make a settlement and end the strike, there was no question of negotiating with an unrecognised union. 

At the end of October the MOA further unsettled the rank and file by stating emphatically that 45,000 workers, who failed to report for work in spite of repeated warnings, had been retrenched. Simultaneously the media was also highlighting the crisis by projecting a picture of the rank and file in a state of complete panic. When the police reported that a textile worker had committed suicide by setting himself on fire, the editors of Indian Express quickly dispatched a reporter to the dead man's house for a complete 'human interest' story on the tragedy. The reporter was specifically briefed on the need for the article to illustrate how the textile strike had driven the poor workers to suicide. The Indian Express coverage of the strike was largely guided by its vigorously anti-Samant policy  a hangover of that  news paper management's tussle with Samant in 1981. The report on the textile worker's suicide as carried on October 14 under the heading 'Worker immolates Himself'. The first two-thirds of the brief news story described in highly emotional terms how, 'unable to withstand the financial burden thrust upon himself by the prolonged strike'; B.G. Pednekar had taken his own life. But Pednekar was no longer on strike when he committed suicide. He had returned to his old job, as a printing supervisor in Jupiter Mills, several weeks earlier. Moreover, Pednekar was no 'lowly worker,. He belonged to the elite or technical staff*. 

Though the Express was not read among the textile workers, its Marathi counterpart Loksatta was widely read in the mill areas and it followed a similar editorial policy. This not only, destroyed Loksatta's credibility among mill workers but made it the object of passionate hatred. Reporters roaming the mill areas were often menacingly asked by workers if they belonged to the Loksatta.. Those who worked for the Indian Express and Loksatta were then obliged to quietly leave the area or risk incurring the workers' wrath. At a later stage the Free Press Journal, apparently following a policy similar to, the Indian Express, carried a report on November 25, with the bold headline 'Workers Cracking Up'.2 The report was based on one doctor's observation, at a public hospital, of 20 cases of mental instability among textile workers during  routine medical examinations of 300 persons over three months. Apart from having no statistical validity such a report presented a one-dimensional and exaggerated view of the situation. 
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* The financial dailies of Bombay had from the outset faithfully supported the millowners. As early as May 1982 the Financial Express reported that workers were trying to return and seeking assurances from the millowners that they would not be victimised. Though not literally accurate, the report was an entirely erroneous presentation of the strike situation at that stage. 
 

That the hardships were heart-rending and back breaking could not be denied. But the sorrow one felt "Was usually overwhelmed by a sense of admiration inspired by the manner in which the battle was being waged. The ample opportunities for casual daily wage labour in Bombay helped many strikers to make enough money to keep body and soul together. But more important than this was the strength of the social fibre and true sense of comadeship which held them together, even while leaders of different ideological hues. were embrolled in bitter and petty quarrels. 

The most pathetic of such quarrels was that between the unholy trinity of George Fernandes, Sharad Pawar and Bal Thackeray; and Samant. The three leaders mounted a common platform on Shivaji Park in October and demanded of Samant that he make immediate efforts to end the strike. At a tlme when the workers' confidence was waning and agonising decisions were being forced upon the strikers, the actions of this trinity were like a slap in their face. Fernandes' involvement with the trio embittered those already disillusioned with him and the bitterness lingered long after the strike had ended.  Over a year and a half later when Fernandes returned to address a meeting at Shivaji Park, on another "working class" issue, textile workers in the audience loudly abused and heckled Fernandes till he was compelled to resume his seat. 

Long after his alliance with Thackery and Pawar had ceased to exist, Fernandes still justified it by arguing  that they had never attacked Samant or questioned his leadership but merely said that an action with dimensions as vast as the textile strike could not be the work of one man alone.  But at the second and last public meeting of this alliance  (in December 1982) Fernandes had gone out of his way to ridicule Samant and assert that he (Samant) did not have a monopoly over the workers.  But in all fairness, by December the main target of this allinace was not Samant but the MOA.  At that second meeting held in front of the MOA's office, the emphasis was on 'warning' the millowners not to tr and move the mills out of Bombay.  It was never specified just what power this political alliance had to enforce its threats.  Neither the millowners not the workers took the Fernandes-Pawar-Thackeray trio, or its threats, very seriously.  Such actions actually inadvertently helped to consolidate Samant's strength among the textile workers.The posture of the Fernandes-Pawar- Thackeray alliance destroyed what little credibility the opposition parties enjoyed among the workers. The opposition parties in general, and these three leaders in particular, came to 
be identified as enemies of the strike effort on par with the Congress(I). For all his organisational failings and tactical errors, Samant accurately assessed the workers' mood. Even though a substantial segment of the rank and file had, since October, been vacillating between the desire to go back to work or continue the battle on to death. Samant knew the struggle would continue. This gave him the confidence to reject outright Chief Minister Bhosale's offer to better the earlier award made by the Labour Minister in Parliament in July. Bhosale offered to raise the advance amount to Rs.l,500. Instead, on October ll, Samant launched the jail bharo and utpadan roko campaign (described earlier). 

The government had proclaimed the jail bharo and utpadan roko andolan a failure. But the agitation was followed by hectic government activity on the strike front. Undoubtedly, much of this activity was superficial, because the government's attitude remained essentially unchanged. Yet this activity had the effect of generating some hope among the workers. Much of the optimism grew out of the intensified nature of the activity at the highest level in both the State and Central Government. On October 23, Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee, Labour Minister Virendra Patil and Commerce Minister Shivraj Patil were all in Bombay to meet Chief Minister Bhosale and RMMS leaders, in a bid to break the stalemate and settle the strike. Sources informing the press about proceedings at these closed door meetings also indicated that the ministers were actively considering scrapping the BIR Act. There was, by this stage, little love lost between the RMMS leadership and the Congress(I) hierarchy. By end October, even Vasant Hoshing and Bhal Bhosale were compelled to publicly criticise the government's policy on the strike,after towing the line for over a year. The RMMS did not even organise a rally, till the sixth month of the strike and then only to protest against the alleged assault of a 'loyal worker'. While Bhal Bhosale and Hoshing had always criticised Samant for his refusal to compromise, they now also denounched the government for groping in the dark. The change in RMMS leadership, on the cards since the strike began, thus became imminent. 

On October 28, within a week of the Union minister's visit to Bombay, the MOA sent a delegation to Delhi led by Arvind Lalbhai, President of the Indian Cotton Mills Federation. The delegation met he Finance Minister and Chief Minister Babasaheb Bhosale was also present at the meeting. The decision to send this delegation to Delhi was a reaction to reports on the grapevine that Samant had met the Prime Minister and a settlement was in the offmg. Samant denied to the end that he ever met Mrs. Gandhi. But several millowners were convinced that the two had met and the unionist had agreed to settle for Rs.50 to Rs.75 increase. However ,the alleged deal had fallen through even before the millowners reached Delhi to prevent a settlement. Samant's insistence that the new offer would be an addition to the earlier offer of Rs.30, supposedly killed the possible settlement. Even the mlllowners' two days of closed door meetings with the Finance Minister failed, to produce a settlement. But the efforts to convince Samant continued. It was discreetly mdicated to the press that Shivraj Patil who was scheduled to visit Bombay shortly, would try to arrive at an informal agreement with Samant. By then the Congress(I) had a vested interest in resolving the strike, or at least seeming to do so, because some of its own M.L.As had started a vigorous anti- RMMS campaign and were demanding that Samant be heard in order to reach a valid settlement. But the M.L..As were largely serving their own ends. 

For a variety of reasons the strike appeared to have finally become enough of an embarrassment for both the State and Central.Governments to disturb and spur them into action. It was in this climate that Chief Minister Bhosale contradicted his earlier stand of refusing to talk with an unrecognised union and invited Samant to a meeting. Much of this activity was due to the Congress(I)'s long  term concern with its electoral future in Bombay. Responding largely to this pressure, a break-away faction of Congress(I) M.L.As attended a rally held by Samant's supporters and passed a resolution demanding that the BIR Act be scrapped. Though they were at pains not to criticise Samant, whom 
they described as a representative of the workers' 'collective conscience', these M.L.As were not primarily interested in the welfare of the strikmg workers. 

In October, when the strike in eight mills completed one year and the general strike showed all signs of doing the same in three months, it had also become a multi-faceted political issue. For example, the primary interest of the M.L.As clalming to be sympathetic to the workers, was to embarrass Chief Minister Bhosale whom they wanted to remove from office. This aspect of their interest in the strike later surfaced at the Nagpur session of the Maharashtra Assembly, in December, where dissidence within the Congress(1) broke out on the floor of the Assembly. Even two months earlier Bhosale was under pressure from both the Central Government and his party's M.L.As. The controversial dinner meeting with Samant on October 30, was a response to these pressures and a last ditch effort to make a face-saving settlement. But all he had to offer was an additional Rs.850 advance money, making the offer a total of Rs.I,500. Bhosale also promised Diwali bonus for those who rejoined work immediately. But the offer of an interim wage hike remained stagnant at Rs.30 and there was still no mention of the most important demand viz. derecognition of the RMMS and scrapping of the BIR Act. Samant, predictably, firmly rejected the offer. The millowners described the offer, which had been made after detailed discussions with them, as 'worth considering'. While the MOA and the government waited for the new offer to produce results, it was condemned from all sides. P.K.Kurne of CITU described the offer as an insult to the 'brave workers'. Shanti Patel, Janata MP and an HMS leader said in a press statement that:  "If the Maharashtra government has serious mtentions to end the textile strike it should stop making unilateral appeals without brining together the involved parties on the negotiating table." 

Even if some among the rank and file were tempted to accept this offer, the activists agreed with Samant's outright refusal. The fact that they were then able to carry the majority of the textile workers with them was proof of their ability to accurately read the workers' mood and readiness to continue flghting. The Diwali bonus offer, especially, had no real value. At that stage, few workers who quit the strike, returned to their own mills. How would a worker of Sriram Mill collect bonus if he was currently working in Sitaram Mills or any other mill? The government's offer to do no more than increase the advance money was unanimously considered a deliberate insult to the workers and their heroic struggle. The token Diwali bonus given by Samant to about 80,000 striking workers had much more value. This money was raised by some 85,000 workers in other units, owing allegiance to Samant, who contributed one day's salary to support the strike effort. The Rs.30 offer lowered the tolerance level of the already frustrated workers. The smallest provocation could trigger off an angry, possibly violent reaction. 
 
On November 18, exactly three months after the police riots, a group of textile workers had gathered at the Bombay High Court for the hearing of a writ petition filed ostensibly by Advocate P.B.Pradhan but master-mainded by the MOA. The workers had waited all day for the hearing to take place. Eventually, when the courts closed for the day and the case had still not been heard, Pradhan told the workers outside to go home.  He added that if they knew what was good for them they would accept and be happy with the Rs. 30 wage increase offered.  The already incensed workers roughed up Pradhan and them some men (it was never verified if they were actually textile workers) ran into the court room and threw the furniture out.  The police arrested 36 men in connection with this incident.* 

The murder of Tukaram Laxman Vadge, an RMMS activist, in December was seen as proof of the increasing role of violence and terror in keeping the strike alive.  But the government's own figures told a different story.  Given the size and duration of the strike it had been remarkably non-violent.  At the end of December the strike had cost 11 lives and the police recorded over a 1,000 cases of assault, stone-throwing and other forms of violence.  Violence did play a role, but not a predominant one, in prolonging the struggle.  Neither Samant not the RMMS had the physical  machinery to terrorise two and a half lakh workers.  Thus, they stayed out of the mills for as long as they wanted to and returned only when compelled by economic necessity.  Peer pressure and other subtle forms of coercive persuasion were liberally used, but their influence would have been negligible if the rank and file had not been determined.  What zone committee activists did, by and large, was to channelise this fervour in the desired direction, and rejuvenate it when it flagged. 
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* The police officer handling the case later told reporters that the whole incident seemed like an attempt to defame textile workers.  Through others (i.e. non-textile workers) may have also participated in the violence, the growing frustration and suppressed anger of many activists was a undeniable reality. 

Yet, in early December, this was proving a backbreaking, uphill task for even the most zealous strike activists.  The poor response to a bandh called by Samant on December 13, did nothing to improve either the activists or the rank and file's morale.  The press, especially the financial dailies reported yet again that the strike was fizzling out.  Their optimism was based on the fact that 17 mills had resumed production. * 

Fernandes and Kurne chose this juncture to once again publicly repeat their criticism of Samant for acting alone-or as Fernandes liked to say 'burrowing a lonely furrow'.  The only voice of encouragement, outside the MGKU and Sarva Sharmik Sangh fold, came  from the original radical leader of the textile workers- S.A. Dange.  At a large public meeting in Prabhadevi, Dange urged workers 'to capture the city' with processions and rallies in every nook and corner of Bombay.  On December 21, the National Campaign Committee of Central Trade Unions organised its first and only public action in support of the textile strike- a one-day general strike of textile mills all over the country.  Over nine lakh textile workers all over the country   were estimated to have participated in this solidarity strike, which was widely proclaimed as a big success.  This only marginally boosted the worker's morale and its material contribution was no greater than the opposition parties walk-out on  the strike issue during the Nagpur session of the Maharashtra Assembly. 
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* But the production of cloth in December 1982 was only 20.970 bales (of 1,500 meters each).  This was less than half of the monthly average production of 44,969 bales (of 1,500 meters each) in 1981.  Moreover, since the production chain remained broken or partially disrupted-because skilled workers in all departments did not return to the mill simultaneously - the quality of cloth produced was poor. 
 
Meanwhile dissident Congress(l) M.L.As continued to use the strike as a weapon against the embattled Babasaheb Bhosale. Baburao Patil, who was intensely disliked in his constituency and was suspected to have connections with the criminal underworld of Bombay went on a one-day hunger strike along with two other M.L.As demanding an early settlement of the strike. When these M.L.As were served with a show cause notice by the Congress(l) high command, for their defiant action, they replied that their efforts were only meant to strengthen the party's image.* Worried about their personal fortunes in contesting the next election on Congress(l) tickets, with the party's popularity in the city at an all-time low, such elements were undaunted by 'disciplinary' measures. While these superficial supporters of the workers' cause had at best some nuisance value within the party, they were not taken seriously by anyone outside the realm of intra-party politics. 

While politicians of all parties indulged in gimmicks of this sort or issued tame statements, the sharpest indictment of the government's handling of the strike came from Justice S.C.Pratap, a soft spoken judge of the Bombay High Court, known for his liberal stand on public interest cases. The writ petition filed by the MOA made the state of Maharashtra, Datta Samant, RMMS and the Police Commissioner of Bombay respondents (in that order). It asked the Court to order the government to declare the strike illegal under the BIR Act; order Samant to withdraw the strike and  refrain from using coercive methods on 'loyal' workers who should be given protection by the police. A brain-child of MOA officials, the case backfired and exploded in their faces with an intensity which thrilled the workers. 
_______________________ 
Bhaurao Patil later followed his mentor A.R.Antulay out of the Congress(l) and joined Antulay's splinter group. 
 
Sharply critical of both the millowners and the government, Justice Pratap ruled that the failure of the government to refer the strike to adjudication, on the grounds that no useful purpose would be served, amounted to a 'breach of statutory duty'. Justice Pratap also noted that at the outset of the case, six months earlier, the MOA seemed willing to refer the matter to adjudication, then later backed out 'obviously in keeping with the wind that blows and power that fluctuates'. Having no powers to directly intervene in the strike, all Pratap could do was to admonish the government and support the workers. He chose his words well when he wrote: 

"In the life history of these workers and in their struggle for justice the strike here, irrespective of political opportunism of rival union and the hypnotic power of their respective leaders, reflects a classic resistance movement based on the hallowed twin principles of non-cooperation and, by and large, non-violence... No judicial conscience alive to the felt necessities of the time can fail to realise the thrust and impact of the resultant injustice to them." 

But a government which would ignore the struggle of a quarter of a million workers for over a year was not susceptible to the pressures of such moral indictments. In industrial circles Justice Pratap was hastily dismissed as a populist judge known for such decisions. For the workers, the judgement provided only moral solace. Materially and effectively it meant nothing. The MOA, which in early December was claiming that daily attendance in the mills had gone up to 61,000, seemed to be gaining ground. Attendance dropped by 10,000 on December 13, when Samant called a bandh but rose again within a week. The period which followed the failure of this bandh was described, even by Yashwant Chavan (of Sarva Shramik Sangh), as a 'miserable situation'. On January 10, a week before the strike's anniversary, the official attendance figure was 79,000. Bharat Patankar, an activist of the Sarva Shramik Sangh who was active in the textile field at that stage, saw one significant factor as being responsible for this rise. Other opposition unions such as the Hind Mazdoor Kisan Panchayat and the Bharatiya Mazdoor Sabha (BMS), which had earlier supported the strike, began holding meetings from the middle of December, telling the textile workers that the strike ought to be called off since they were suffering while the millowners and the government were not being hurt. Simultaneously, the number of police raids on the homes of textile workers, at night, and random arrests of these workers increased. 

The MGKU and Sarva Shramik Sangh therefore launched a programme of counter propaganda and held chawl meetings allover the mill areas to win back workers who were breaking away 'from the strike. As the police swooped down on these meetings and picked up the activists, fresh batches of speakers and organisers arrived every day to carry in the campaign. According to Patankar, the flow of workers began to be reversed around December 25: "The workers can't stand the oppression of the RMMS inside the mills. Yet they are afraid of coming back out because they have signed a promise of good conduct on paper, so they need to be assured, that everyone is doing so." Patankar, who had just then returned from a tour of villages, reported that rural-based workers who had come to Bombay were once again heading back to the villages instead of re-joining the mills. 
 

Though the MOA officially claimed that attendance was 75,000 on the eve of the strike completing one year, officials of the mills acknowledged that attendance had dropped again. This gave credance to the theory that workers who were going back to the mills were still part of the strike effort and willing to quit work when they had earned a little money to live on. Moreover, at that stage, workers were hopeful that when the strike completed one year the government would feel compelled to act and concede some of their demands. Only a week earlier the Congress(I) had been routed in the Assembly elections of Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh. The activists were aware of the fears of the Congress(I) leadership that the wave of discontent which had swept through the two southern states would also blow the way of Maharashtra. Seeing themselves as a major vote bank, the restive workers hoped that in this moment of insecurity Mrs.Gandhi may make substantial concessions to the strikers. The party high command in Delhi may even be pressurised by the state unit to alter its stand on Samant, many activists felt. Congress(I) officials in Bombay privately helped to create 
this impression. As one such official said: "She (Mrs. Gandhi) is really down, right now, and there's no saying what can happen." 
 

Regardless of the larger political context, the MGKU and Sarva Shramik Sangh had already decided to intensify the struggle before the election results of the southern states were known. On December 30, various unions, along with the MGKU and Sarva Shramik Sangh, gathered at the Shramik office to draft and adopt the following resolution: "The textile strike is a struggle for fundamental trade union rights of the working class and against offensive turn in the anti-working class policies of the government... The paltry interim relief announced by Bhagwat Jha Azad, the then Central Labour Minister and later by the Maharashtra Chief, Minister is just a poor joke which only a washed-out clown can crack." The resolution went on to emphasise the importance of reinforcing the struggle of the valiant textile workers and the need to act quickly to strengthen the strike: "In pursuance of these objectives... and in view of the fact that the TUJAC has been completely inactivated by internal differences we deem it necessary and expedient to declare the formation of the Textile Strike Solidarity Committee, and appeal to all trade unions in Bombay to join the committee." This committee, it was decided, would act on the following points: I) collection drive for textile workers; 2) solidarity demonstrations where clusters of factories and offices are located; 3) locality-wise working class committees to be formed to think out ways of helping to strengthen the textile strike. 
 

But such working class committees had already long been in existence. The Solidarity Committee was essentially an unimproved reincarnation of the TUJAC. The members of the existing workers committees were unsung heroes of the strike. Samant acknowledged this and mentioned it in an interview to Olga Tellis on the eve of the strike anniversary: 'One of the most fascinating things in the history of trade unions action is that the humble, young  textile workers, without what people like to call 'ideology' or 'isms', have the tenacity, indomitable courage and moral fibre to continue the strike. I never imagined it myself when I gave the call for the strike. I cannot imagine other workers doing the same. I also feel damn disturbed that lakhs of workers are out for so long. We need immediate economic changes. What is disturbing is that instead of fighting economic exploitation and exploiters the government is doing everything within its power to protect such exploiters." Samant ended on the emphatic note that the strike was going strong and there was no question of it fizzling out soon. 
 

But the millowners with a peculiar brand of logic claimed that the strike was already 'fizzling out'. Kanti Kumar Podar said in January 1983 that: "The strike is fizzling out, it will never be called' off, and there will be no settlement. What for and with whom?" this claim was backed by the following strange logic. Though the industry employs 2.3 " lakh workers only about 1.8 lakh of them are required on any given day-including supervisory, technical and security staff. Thus, out of the 1.8 lakh only about 1.51 lakh are workers (the others being categorised as 'staff'). Mr.Podar claimed that since 75,000 workers in the latter category had " returned to the mills -constituting 52% of the normal work force on any given day -the strike was 'fizzling out'. Podar went still further and said that since attendance in the 13 nationalised mills was low and seven other mills were not producing, these should be excluded from the calculations. On taking an average of the functioning mills Podar claimed the daily attendance was 65% of the normal attendance. On this basis Podar proclaimed: "We have stopped talking of the strike. It has fizzled out; 65% have returned and the rest may be on strike even in 1984. I take it they are not interested in coming back." 

But by then the unprecedented struggle which Podar pretended to dismiss as insignificant, had broken most previous strike records. At the end of one year the textile strike alone had resulted in the loss of 48 million mandays as against 32.50 million  mandays lost in the whole country the year before and an annual average loss of 20 million mandays. The previous record had been set in 1974, the year of the railway strike, when 43 million mandays were lost. 

Yet, these startling statistics meant as little in Podar's plush corporate office as in the narrow lanes of Sidhartha Nagar. A light mist hovered over the slum when i went there on a cool January morning. Streams of muddy water flowed along the narrow lanes where putrid heaps of garbage lay at every corner, as permanent fixtures of a dismal scenario. Lata, who was busy washing utensils outside her hut, smiled wearily as she saw me. Khandeo sat on the wire mesh bed inside the hut. The man who had talked with feeling about the strike throughout the year was speechless, confused and bewildered by its duration. 

Nearby, in the loft of another hutment, G.S.Gajarmal was at work, surrounded by pamphlets, books and newspapers about trade unionism and 'the struggle'. For Gajarmal, the quintessential activist who continued to vigorously plan small meetings, every day that the strike lasted only further intensified his commitment to the struggle. There were doubts -but only about the course of events in the short run. Overriding this was the unshakable confidence in the justice and eventual triumph of his cause. The once fiery K.P.Kamble who had talked of a bada kranti still shared Gajarmal's views but not his confidence. If Gajarmal was hounded by the police, Kamble as a jobber was also badgered by the officer of his mill to return to work. Kamble was a sad and disheartened man, for whom bada kranti was now just a pipe-dream. 

Lata was more vocal than Kamble and more deeply embittered. If she had sparkled with optimism a year earlier, she now bristled with anger -much of it directed at Samant. Lata had no use for those who sang praises of workers' solidarity. To her, talk of solidarity was a mere abstraction at a time when all around there was only more and more suffering. The woman who had talked with zest and revolutionary fervour about challenging the 'other world', the realm of seth log began to sink in the quick sands of fatalism. Her fighting strength, was at the penultimate stage of depletion. Lata, Gajarmal and Kamble, each viewed and experienced  the strike at different levels. Each was a microcosm of some aspect of the strike. Yet these were the lucky ones. Others died, broke limbs during lathi-charges, lost their preciously built huts in the metropolis and hawked every valuable they possessed. 

But every time Khandeo, and thousands of others like him, were tempted to return to the mills the expectation of a settlement being imminent held them back. And yet the desire to return did not minimise Khandeo's or Lata's commitment to the strike cause. There were traces. of resentment towards Samant along with a recognition of his  shortcomings as a political strategist but their loyalty to him did not waver. But there was no comfort in having faith in a person who produced no results. For thousands like Lata a clearer perception of the deep-rooted nature of vested interests at work only further reinforced their sense of powerlessness. Only those who, like Gajarmal, sought the aid of ideology through books and pamphlets, found their convictions growing stronger and acquiring even deeper roots. 

Of the tens of thousands who came to the anniversary rally at Shivaji Park on January 18, 1983, the majority had mixed emotions. The rally was one of the biggest during the strike even  though the MGKU had feared that the government may prevent workers from reaching the rally ground. But apart from a few skirmishes between MGKU and RMMS activists, there was no major attempt by the authorities to prevent workers from attending the rally. 

As the sun set on January 18, about one lakh men and women sat before the towering statue of Shivaji, waiting to hear Doctor speak. There was, in the large crowd, a sense of pride and even triumph though by all conventional definitions they had won nothing and lost a great deal. But even three weeks later, on February 8, the Labour Commissioner's office acknowledged that over 60% (or 1,41,150) workers were still on strike. This, in itself, was an achievement. And yet that moment of triumph in the shadow of Shivaji's statue was also the beginning of the end.