But the government and the miliowners knew from the outset that nothing of the sort was happening or was even likely to happen. The policies which led to the creation of an unbreakable stalemate, were based on a close knowledge of the state of the established central trade unions and their in- ability to function effectively together. The government relied on the internal rivalries of the unions to make a mockery of the most valiant workers' struggle. 

Therefore, dramatic pronouncements by the strike leadership about the Indian working class on the warpath in the form of 2.5 lakh textile workers left the bureaucracy and the ruling elite unmoved. This was a result of not only an insensitivity to the implications and dimensions of the turmoil in Bombay but also a certain disdain for the over- statements by professed 'supporters' of the working class cause. Consequently most decision makers failed to perceive and acknowledge the textile workers' capacity for indigenous organisation which was primarily responsible for the intensity and long duration of the struggle. 

The textile workers first rose in unison in 1908 to protest the conviction of Lokmanya Tilak in a sedition case, for which he was sentenced to six years rigorous imprisonment. For six days all mills remained shut. The violence which accompanied this strike left 15 people dead, many others injured, and brought the military out on the streets of Bombay. The strike had, no leaders or organisation and it was as much revolt against the conviction of  Tilak as against the working and living conditions of the mill hands. Lenin on hearing reports of this uprising had written: "The Indian proletariat has already matured sufficiently to wage a class-conscious and political mass struggle and that being the case Anglo-Russian methods in India are played out."l Events which followed proved Lenin wrong and the methods which he thought had run their course, kept the British Empire in tact for another 40 years. 

Long after the imperial forces had relinquished political control in India the proletariat was no closer to getting its fair share, let alone control, of, state power. In the post-Independence period the Indian left failed to effectively harness the frustrations of that 50% of the population which remained below the poverty line. The geographic and demographic spread of trade unions remained limited even three and a half decades after Independence. Only 10%.. of the Indian work force was in yhe orga- nised sector and of this 25% was not unionised. Landless agricultural labour -which constituted 50% of the work force had almost no effective organisation let alone trade unions. At the beginning of the 1980s almost. 70% of the trade unions in India were' in six states, namely Uttar Pradesh, Tamil Nadu; Maharashtra, West Bengal, Kerala and Bihar. These states also accounted for 60% of the total membership of registered trade unions. Till 1975  only 1.7% of the unions in India had a membership of over 5,000 workers each, while 73.2% of the unions had a membership below 300.2 The National Commission of  Labour noted as far back as 1966 that the common constraints for unionization are: 1) the casual nature of employment, 2) ignorance and illiteracy of workers, 3) small size of the business establishment with low per capita investment per person employed, 4) scattered nature of establishment and 5) superior strength of employers operating singly or in combination. Thus the strongest unions were formed in the oldest and biggest industries. Membership of unions in cotton textile, coal and basic metal alloy industries accounted for 50% of the total membership of unions in 12 major industries. 

This narrow base was further- weakened by the repeated and frequent splitting of the central trade unions which led their affiliates to compete as much with each other as they fought with managements. The first split occurred after the militant upsurge of. 1928 when the Bombay textile strike thrust the communists to the forefront of the 'workIng leadership and moderates led by N.M.Joshi left the All India Trade Union Congress (AITUC), the first central trade union body in India. In 1931 a group of orthodox communists split from the AITUC and formed the Red Trade Union Congres(RTUC). In the following two years, 50,000 workers in Bombay were thrown out of their jobs and in 1934 almost every textile mill reduced wages. The divisions in the union seriously hampered the effective organisation of strikes and protests, and the cost was paid by workers. The vagaries of the trade unIons and the frivolity of these splits was manifest in their decisions to re-unite. The RTUC returned. to the fold and merged with AITUC In 1935 and Joshi's group, the National Trade Union Federation o(NTUF), followed in 1940. But the next year another group of radicals, who opposed any support to the British, left to form the Indian Federation of Labour. This body was in intense competition with the AITUC by the end of World War II. After Independence almost every political party established tts own trade union wing. The Congress set up lNTUC. The Socialists formed the Hind Mazdoor Panchayat. which' merged with the Federation of Labour to create the H.Jnd Mazdoor Sabha (HMS). A set of dissatisfied ,Soctallsts set up yet another body, called It the' United Trade Union Congress (UTUC) and affIliated it  to the Revolutionary Socialists Party. 

 The decade of the 1950s was marked with numerous attempts by these bodies to unite or arrive at 'understandings' about areas of activity and thus curtail competition. But these efforts proved futile and in 1959 the HMS split yet again with some Socialist Party leaders quitting to form the Hind Mazdoor Panchayat. 

Eleven years later the spilt in the Communist Party of India (CPI) divided the AITUC and created the Centre of Indian Trade Unions (CITU), controlled by the Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPI-M). The 1969 split in the Congress party similarly Spilt INTUC and led to the formation of the National Labour Organisation led by the Congress(O). In 1972 the INTUC, AITUC and HMS arrived at an accord on the issue of determining recognition of unions where more than one is in competition. But the CITU was not party to this National Council of Central Trade Unions and for- med its own United Council of  Trade Union.o Both bodies died without achieving anything when the 
emergency was declared in 1975. 

The most devastating effects of this fragmentation were felt by the workers. Due to the incessant splitting at the national level local unions were often left with inadequate finance and vacillating membership support. In this politically vitiated atmosphere workers' loyalties were not given a chance to grow. Studies have found that workers see unions as intermediaries to secure economic benefits and protection against management's arbitrary actions. Therefore, if the union fails to deliver, workers will seek another union because their involvement with any union is more on a contractual basis than ideological or philosophical. 4 In the earlier stages of industrialisation workers tended to attempt improving their socio-economic condition through a temporary alliance with industry and were submissive. If conditions became too distasteful they tended not to strike but abandon 
individual mills or industries. Moreover, as has often been said, the Indian Labour movement was born out of philanthropy and has been a movement for the worker not by the worker. 5 

Labour movement presumes a higher degree of consciousness among workers than conveyed by mere trade union objectives.6 And such a movement is yet to develop in India. Meanwhile, much of the theorising by academics and trade union leaders has concentrated on the 'management' of the rank and file. Consequently, over the last decade there has been a growing demand for greater autonomyof unions from political parties and at a unit level from the central trade union body. It is out of such trends that a movement could grow. And the textile strike was perhaps the most radical manifestation of this grass roots trend. But then the RMMS was also an extreme example of the process of degeneration and complacency which afflicted central trade unions at the turn of the decade. 

To a large extent the RMMS's ills were the result of an inevitable process. After spending the first decade and a half of its existence in a few unpretentious rooms the RMMS built 'Mazdoor Manzil', a sprawling multi-storey building with a grand central staircase. The lawns of the approximately one acre plot occupied by the RMMS, in the heartland of the Bombay's textile mills, were guarded by a high wall and imposing gate. In the years that followed more buildings were added and the corridors were decorated with a collection of portraits which serve as a historical record of the heavyweights of Maharashtra politics who also graced the offices of the RMMS. The range of portraits included the somewhat Machiavellian Rajni Patel, who was once President of the RMMS but died defending Datta Samant in court, and Vasantdada Patil who retained his old RMMS loyalties when it came to taking a stand against Samant. 

By the end of 1981 the RMMS was collecting Rs.3 lakhs in monthly subscriptions from the textile workers. Workers earning wages below Rs.l,000 paid Rs.2 per month and those earning more paid Rs.3 per month. The monthly expenses of the union were about Rs.1,70,000. This went to pay the 110 full time staff -members of the union and for the upkeep of the two buildings which included a theatre,  several lecture halls and a hostel. The Ambedkar Institute of  Labour studies also had its offices and library at Mazdoor Manzil, and was funded by the RMMS. As a recognized union the RMMS had always adopted a legalistic approach to the problems of workers and in the total absence of struggle it became at best a bureaucratic monolithic body  and at its worst a repressive machinery for the enforcement of the millowners' law. Its very origins were rooted in the Congress party's strategy to counter communist thtreats and gain control over this vital chunk of Bombay's industrial workers. Its purpose over the years remained the same, namely, to neutralise radical elements which sought to con- trol the textile workers. 

The system of representation within the union reflected the nature of functions it was required to perform. The RMMS was ostensibly governed, by a Joint Board of Workers 'elected' from each mill, with each Joint Board member representing 100 workers. But instead of holding an open elec- tion workers were required to 'apply' for seats. A secret ballot was held only if there were more applicants than seats in a particular mill. Even then, every effort was made by the union hierarchy to dissuade other contender  from contesting the 'election' in order to allow one worker, obviously of their choice, to be 'elected'. The Joint Board then elected the executive body including the President, General Secretary, Treasurer and other officials. When the pre-strike unrest erupted in late 1981, RMMS officials pointed to the ratification of the 1979 agreement by the Joint Board. But since the Joint Board had no credibility as a truly representative body the acceptance of the 1979 agreement had no relevance. 

Evelyn D'Souza, treasurer and office factotum of the RMMS tended to respond sharply to such criti- cism and questioned if by the same criterion Parliament and the Union Cabinet could be held to be representative. Hoshing saw no reason to decry this institutionalisation. "People come and go" he 
said, "but the institution survives. Today the trade union movement has become just a shop, nothing more." Given the function which the Congress party and MOA expected it to fulfil, the RMMS never sought to be an expression of the workers' movement at the plant level. Subsequent failures were products of this historical background and institutional structure. 

INTUC policy followed the precepts of Gandhi, whose views on trade unions and labour struggle were unrealistic even in his own time. The INTUC President N.K.Bhatt described his union's policy in the following manner: "We work not solely for the working class but for the whole country and for the working class as apart of it.", Such an approach was bound to leave major lacunae in effective labour representation -which Samant filled. That there was "something lacking" in the RMMS thven Bhatt acknowledged. During the last one decade specifically, the RMMS failed to understand the technological changes and the impact on workload and wages. Bagaram Tulpule noted that the "RMMS dealt with each specific measure of modernisation in each mill as an isolated case. Some wage increases on an adhoc basis were negotiated in each case, but these were limited to only those workers who directly tended the new higher technology equipment -leaving the bulk of benefits of the new technology in the hand of the employers... The representative union should have taken the initiative to demand a complete revision of the entire wage structure, to bring it in line with the present technological and economic realities and job differentials." 

'On an average the RMMS signed 200 modernisation agreements every year. Most of these agree- 
ments related to the scrapping of machines, introduction of new machines and clubbing of jobs which resulted in reduction of the work force from eight to sixty, on an average. With the unflinching sup- port of the Government behind it the RMMS continued to act in this manner with impunity and no fear of threats to its power over the textile workers. The frequent and successful inroads made into the textile sphere by other unions, were dismissed as a not unusual 'tide'.8 After the hard and bitter battle of the textile strike ,was over and RMMS General Secretary Bhai Bhosale had been ousted from office he still claimed to have established 'trend-setting' system of variable D.A.in 1973, which gave workers additional benefits. Why this agreement was then followed by a strike was explained by Bhosale with the following: "Dange Sahab, with his magic, saw that there was a strike." 

If the failures of the RMMS were colossal they were also in built and probably unavoidable. But the major trade unions affiliated to the opposition parties could not avail of such an excuse. As Colum- nist Sumanta Banerjee noted:' "The record of the major trade union organisations during the last three decades -their failure to evolve a new strategy that would go beyond the mere economism of struggle for higher wages, opportunistic deals with employers or government to maintain their 
positions -had led to some disillusionment with the conventional organisations among the Indian working class. This is reflected in the mushrooming of maverick trade unions -independent of the major political parties and national trade union organisations in several parts of the country.  There had been self-generated area committees of workers in Pune during the Emergency which were active in resisting victimisation of workers and other forms of repression. The more famous and offcited examples of independent trade unionism was A.K.Roy, a former CPI(M) member in Dhanbad who organised mine workers and tribal peasants. Shankar Guha , Neogy, another trade unionist not affiliated to any central trade union body organised unions of mine workers, tribal youth and landless labourers , Madhya Pradesh. 

Bagaram Tulpule was equally scathing about the failure of the major trade union organisations in the country: "None of them seem to have devoted much thought to the movement as a whole: its philosophy and goals in the unfolding socio-economic and political milieu, its growth in the post-independence era, its strengths and weaknesses, achievements and failures, the challenges it faces today and the ideas, strategy and methodology it must adopt to meet these challenges effectively."9 

Though cries for unity from trade union leaders date back to the origin of rivalries nothing has actually been done to prevent compulsive splitting and multiplicity. Even when a challenge of the magnitude of Datta Samant arose there was no effective introspection .leading to an active response. Condemning the Individual trade unionists set upon empire building' Tulpule noted: "Most of the established trade union organisations, it is true, do not . practice this methodology of rowdyism, violence and terror. But they also do not seem to be doing anything to combat the henious spread of these methods. The apparent success of these individuals is a phenomenon that calls for a serious study by the movement since their methods may in time completely swamp established trade union methods or organisation, and collective bargaining. A movement which deliberately indulges in these. methods will inevitably invite repression against itself and workers' interests will suffer thereby."l0 

The left trade unions did publicly support Samant, on the textile strike but their support meant little to Samant. Tulpule again commented on the divided nature of the leading Marxist groups (CITU, AITUC and Lal Nishan): "Therefore the idea that their support to the (textile) strike, such as it is, will bring strength to the Marxist cause or will bring Samant within respective and distinct spheres of influence seems as bizarre as the proverbial tail seeking to wag the dog".ll. The state of confusion among the left central 'trade unions was perhaps best illustrated by the events surrounding the 
second all India one-day strike on January 19, 1982. Radha Iyer reported in Business Standard that the central trade unions which had called that bandh, did little ground work and the government began to take the bandh seriously only when the opposition parties announced their support early in January. 

The bandh was eventually marked by numerous instances of spontaneous response from sectors not covered by the organised trade unions. Despite the railwaymen's union instructing its members to 
report for work, both union leaders and management suspected that workers would defy the order and took elaborate precautionary measures. But workers from small scale sector units in north Bombay, where in some cases there were no unions, participated in the bandh. Since the leadership had called no meetings or organised any programme for the bandh, no union activists were seen on the streets. Yet there were examples of demonstrations organised by the local level militant trade union leadership. 

In Bhiwandi, the Janata, CPM, HMS and an independent youth organisation had set up a united 
action committee and decided to take a procession through the town. On the day itself, however, only the youth organisation could mobilize some people and took out a procession of about 300 volunteers who did not confine themselves to the issue of the bandh but also focused on the problems of the powerloom workers. Similarly, in Nagpur, though the HMS backed out of the bandh several workers in its fold stayed away from work that day. This is proof, Iyer wrote, that "the workers were willing to lead the struggle and that the leadership is not. It showed that even when they did organise one it was only a passive one and not an active militant action. The fact that it was only after the political parties decided to support the bandh that the government began its onslaught against the bandh on such a scale also indicates that the government is not seriously worried about workers' action or trade union action. What it is worried about is political action and the growth of political forces. Ultimately, even the government realises that it is not trade unionism but political forces that can be dangerous to its political power..."*12 

So when George Fernandes criticised Samant for fighting a political battle on the basis of a strike alone, he was not far from the truth. Derecognition of the RMMS and scrapping of the BIR Act were major political issues for the government but -posed little danger so long as Samant stood alone with a strike of "only a fraction of industrial workers." Fernandes characterised thi.s as 'saber 

rattling at the government, millowners and other trade unions. But Fernandes' role, and that of his contemporaries, was even more disturbing and workers were not oblivious to this. Attacking the established central trade union was inherent to Samant's style which in turn was determined by the mood and demands of the rank and file. "Samant has guts, no doubt, but he lacks wits" Somnath Dube of the Hind Mazdoor Kisan Panchayat (HMKP), liked to say. But Samant had enough wits to see that the old style trade unionism was on its way out -it is debatable whether the new style which he evolved would be beneficial in the long run but it had the power to make an immediate impact. 
In his more candid comments even Fernandes acknowledged the "deradicalization of his own union, the HMKP, and talked about the cadre becoming 'stablility and security conscious'. As he pondered over the vast institutional structure set up by his unions Fernandes wondered if "I made a mistake in building a strong organisation." This was a veteran firebrand's acknowledgement of the difficulty in reviving militancy. While Fernandes' union and other trade unions were" passing through a non-radical period the workers' militancy' grew unhampered. Similarly Yashwant Chavan of the Sarva Shramik Sangh, believed that "Oatta Samant has risen out of this as an expression of what was brewing in the working masses." 

 Whether Samant could truly harness this unrest to constructive use was, at that stage, immaterial. He could and did spearhead it. But most of the established central trade union leaders failed to see in this an opportunity to thrust the working class movement a giant step forward and instead perceived a threat to their own standing and the future structure of trade unions. Somnath Dube was among the more can,did, for he said: "A struggle of 2.3 lakh textile workers is not a political revolution. But had he (Samant) succeeded, the other trade unions here (Bombay) would have been wiped out; this was the obvious reason for their inability to stand by and support him. Everyone.feared this, and (they were) happy that here was the MOA  -  a powerful body with direct access to Mrs.Gandhi -which will bring Samant to his Waterloo.That was a very wrong way of thinking. I for one feel guilty- that we have not been able to do justice to the situation. It was such an historic event. I have lived in the mill area for three decades but never seen anything like this; the fer- vor was umatched."13 

While almost all trade unionists would agree that" the workers' mood was unprecedented they also unanimously suspected Samant's politics. His refusal to attend the trade union convention held at Shan- mukhananda Hall in' June 1981,  together with his refusal to come on a common platform against the government was interpreted as being covert support of Mrs. Gandhi. Even as the strike became long drawn out, many veteran" unionists suspected that Samant was negotiating with the Congress(l) for a place within the party. His refusal to participate in the one-day national strike on January 19, 1982, was seen as further proof of his dubious political leanings. The AITUC's textile union, the Girni Kamgar Union (GKU), made several efforts even after this to get involved with Samant's pro- grammes and suppor! him. The GKU stand, Chitnis explained, was determined by the: conviction that "the real confrontation in the Indian working class movement is not between us and Doctor. We were not jealous of Doctor. We passed a resolution of support and handed it to Samant.". 

But these resolutions meant little to Samant for he knew most workers who once owed loyalty to the GKU and other unions were already behind him. With his highly personalised, adhoc and unorganised style of functioning Samant ' had limited use for the activist cadre of these unions -except those who were unconditionally willing to support him. The only such union was the Sarva Shramik Sangh, a left trade union affiliated to the Lal Nishan party which split from the CPI in 1942 on the issue of supporting the British in the war effort. Dange almost contemptuously dismissed the Sarva Shramik Sangh as having no base of its own. Other left trade unions by and large accused it of using Samant's mass base. But the Shramik activists insisted that they supported the strike because. it was a landmark struggle between the workers and the government-millowner combine. Even the Shramik activists in Pune were trying to organise workers on the issue of the textile strike. 

Shrumik Vichar, a daily newspaper committed to the cause of the working class and published by the Shramik, actively supported the strike. The Shramik Vichar, printed on a small, almost antique, press in two ramshacklf; rooms in one corner of Pune be- came a major source of information and inspiration for the strikers. When a delegation of the Bombay strikers went to Pune they made it a point to visit the Shramik Vichar office to meet the workers and ask them to keep the paper alive at any cost with a promise of monetary contribution when their battle had been won. The Shramik leaders held that .the popular upsurge of the textile workers was a crucial development in the Indian working class movement and must be supported. 
 
Unlike most of the other left trade unions the Shramik did not view the fallacies in Samant's method of operation as sufficient ground to stay aloof from the strike or to quietly oppose it. The opportunity for Shramik to strengthen its own base was obvious and many of the more acutely aware striking workers resented this. The Shramik leadership, however, maintained a stand which was concerned with the larger aims. V .G.Deshpande, a Shramik leader in Pune, put it thus: "If Doctor can be given a broadly left orientation, the potential of a revolutionary turn is there in this". 

Apart from the Shramik there were activists from other established unions, mostly young people, who for personal or institutional reasons saw the importance of Samant and the limitations of their old, organisations. Regardless of how actively or inactively their trade unions were supporting the strike these activists got busy among the rank and file of strikers without being asked or told to do so. 

The rank and file itself was unflinchingly behind the Samant regardless of previous trade. union affi- liations. As we shall shortly see, the mood and its manifestations were such that the leaders of other unions could not playa role even if they wanted to. In April, three months after the strike begarl, Samant and Fernandes shared a platform where Fernandes expressed his reservations about the strike -Fernandes had said in December '81 that the piled up stocks of cloth in mills and the glut in the market forbode ill for any strike at that juncture. Secondly, Fernandes felt that Samant's 
decision to 'bury a lonely furrow', despite offers of support from others, was likely to endanger .the strike effort. Fernandes acknowledged Samant's unchallenged leadership of the textile workers and left the decisions to him. 

Fernandes and the HMS even supported a Maharashtra bandh called by Samant on April 19. At that stage the determination of the textile workers was just beginning to be perceived by the RMMS, millowners and other trade unions as an unchangeable reality. The early claim of the MOA and government, that the strike could not last beyond "a few weeks", was losing ground.. As the strike entered the third month the RMMS and mlllowners Intensified their lobbying. 

Several millowners approached union ministers to seek direct Central Government Intervention in the strike. On the other hand unions in other Industries and even among white collar workers, like the LIC, began raising funds to help the textile workers. Amid speculatIon about a possible change of leadership in the RMMS, and the deepening financial crisis of the mills, Union Commerce Minister 
Shivraj Patel  flew down to Bombay on April 16 to examine the possibilities of breaking the stalemate. Whatever their private apprehensions,publicly the MOA maintained that the strike was bound to  fizzle out shortly and the process had already  begun. Shivraj Patel, who at the stage was Mrs. Gandhi's eyes and ears on this impression back to Delhi. The re.asoning offered to back up this claim was that  with the onset of monsoon,in a  month and half, the wor kers who had gone  to their villages would be compelled to return to the city. June-July has traditionally been a peak attendance period in the mills. 

Those who held this failed to note, or deliberately chose to ignore, the process of consolidation underway in that parallel world with which they had no contact. In the villages the textile workers who had returned were busy organising the support of rural masses, particularly the poor and middle peasants. In the city te workers were equally busy fulfilling their promise to Samant to manage the strike on their own. The century-old tradition in indigenous agitational organisation was coming into play and producing a phenomenon whose characteristics and dimensions defied traditional definations and classifications. Herein lay the answers for those who were baffled by the mystry of the workers' tenacity and ability to conduct a marathon strike.