Forgotten Links: Focus on Existing Projects, Not "River Garland" by Som Pal

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/868111.cms

Forgotten Links: Focus on Existing Projects, Not 'River Garland'

SOM PAL

[ THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 30, 2004 12:00:00 AM ]

The 'Garland of Hope' (Aug 14) by Suresh Prabhu, chairman of the task force on the river linking project, contains the oft-repeated data on rainfall, utilisable and already harnessed water resources. The core issues needing straight answers seem to have escaped his attention, some of which have since been addressed by Dunu Roy in his 'Garland of Hype' (Aug 27). The present write-up is a humble attempt to fill the gap.

The idea of linking the rivers was first mooted by K L Rao during 1970s, and later by Capt M N Dastur. In 1982, the Union government set up the National Water Development Agency (NWDA) to study all the aspects and prepare feasibility reports. The NWDA has identified two components — the Himalayan comprising 16 northern rivers and the Peninsular having 14 southern rivers. The estimate of investment needed is Rs 5,60,000 crore and the irrigation potential as 25 million hectares.

The assumption that there is surplus water available for transfer to other basins is not correct. Most of the river basins of India are deficit ones. It may be argued that the flood waters during the monsoon can be transferred to deficit areas. But most of the existing dam reservoirs seldom get filled to cater to the given requirements of irrigation and power generation. The flooded rivers also carry a huge load of silt, which is likely to choke the channels. De-silting operations would involve disproportionate recurring expenditure. Usually there is no demand for irrigation in the rainy season, and the quantum, and the period when overflows would be available, is uncertain.

Brahmaputra is the only river with surplus water, which can be brought to the eastern states either through Bangladesh or the narrow strip between Bangladesh and Nepal borders. Both, however, are fraught with almost insurmountable problems. The other route lies in the area categorised as 'danger zone 5' for its high level of seismic vulnerability. Advancements in the science of civil engineering perhaps can take care of safety of dams against seismic shocks. But insulating a long canal from such hazards, however, should be a very high cost affair, besides not being foolproof. Even a hairline crack in the bottom or the bank can cause catastrophic floods.

The Himalayan link canal proposed by Capt Dastur was considered unfeasible for two reasons. First, the investment required was put at Rs 12 lakh crore, which was considered grossly disproportionate. Secondly, the extremely fragile lower Himalayan terrain frequently visited by earthquakes and landslides was not suitable for such a lengthy structure. Taking the Ganga water to the southern plateau involved steep lifts up to several hundred feet at some places. Technical feasibility apart, the immense investment and energy needed would not be commensurate with the potential benefit.

No less important are the political and legal problems. The way various states have been quarrelling with each other over water, flouting not only the tribunal awards but also the apex court orders, poses a serious question mark on the feasibility of the project.

The moot point is whether there could be a viable approach to solving the water problem. The Tenth Plan document has presented a scenario. According to the Plan, there are 383 ongoing major and medium projects awaiting completion, 111 of which are pending since pre-fifth Plan period i.e. more than 26 years. All these can be completed within five to eight years, yielding an additional potential of about 14 million hectares at a cost of Rs 77,000 crore as estimated by the plan task force, now raised to Rs 100,000 crore. The second component listed in the Plan is development of minor irrigation, mostly in the eastern and north eastern regions. The total potential assessed is 24.5 million hectares with a total investment of Rs 54,000 crore, of which the government is expected to provide only Rs 13,500 crore, the balance coming from beneficiary farmers and institutional loans. The success of such a scheme has clearly been demonstrated in Assam, where only 33,000 tubewells, of the planned 100,000, have helped the perennially foodgrain deficit state become surplus one within two to three years. The cost per hectare is only Rs 20,000 and gestation period almost nil, against a cost of Rs 100,000 and 12 years' gestation in case of major and medium projects. The annual rainfall in the region, ranging from 1,200 mm to 5,000 mm, is enough to keep the groundwater regularly recharged. Most of the tubewells being shallow, the cost of installation and power consumption would be low. The third equally beneficial scheme mentioned in the Plan is the groundwater recharge master plan prepared by the Central Ground Water Board needing Rs 24,500 crore to trap 36 billion cubic metres of water annually. The Plan, however, has allocated only paltry sums for this exercise.

There is a readily available alternative which can create about 50 million hectares of irrigation potential in five to eight years with an investment of Rs 1,38,000 crore. Legal, environmental, resettlement and distributional issues either do not arise or have been settled. On the other hand, there is a far-fetched plan requiring Rs 5,60,000 crore expected to yield only 25 million hectare irrigation and fraught with so many insurmountable problems. The choice seems clear.

(The author is a former minister of state for agriculture and water resources.)