Despite the official secular programme of the nationalist movement, the dominant culture of
nationalism remained Hindu.  Thirty years after Independence the pattern continues and the
Muslim still feels an outsider, says Imtiaz Ahmad.
 

Communalism, wrote Thompson and Garratt, "is an old Indian problem that time does little
to solve." Official statistics indicate that there are, on an average, more than one hundred
communal clashes every year. (Last year the official figure was 400.) These repeated outbreaks
of communal frenzy destroy more than just a few lives and property. The claim of the Hindus that
India is a secular state, the hope of the Indian Muslims that they can live in peace and communal
amity, and the conviction of progressive and liberal-minded intellectuals in the possibility of the
emergence of a secular social order in India in the future, all suffer a serious blow.

To argue that the problem of communalism today is a creation of the communal parties alone
amounts to granting them a kind of semi-divine role, or, at any rate, to making politics an
autonomous power. If the communal parties are able to arouse communal feelings and tensions
successfully, it is because the prevailing social climate Is favourable for such a development.
Even the so-called secular political parties and organisations including the Congress, are at
present pursuing many policies and using electoral strategies which can be shown to have
directly contributed to the intensification of communal tensions. One of the principal difficulties
in the effort to explore to the canvas of communalism arises from the somewhat exaggerated
viewof the indian past among intellectuals and laymen alike who try to trace almost all aspects
ofhuman civilisation back to their ancient and rich cultural heritage. This tendency was strongest
during the freedom movement. In those days the Indian  past was glorified and elements which
seemed to give the Europeans a sense of  superiority , and consequently enabled them to justify
their right to rule, were seen as existing in the Indian past.

One can easily understand the tendency among scholars to glorify the past during the freedom
struggle. However, persistence of this tendency with respect to secularism, especially, has had
somewhat unfortunate consequences. It has encouraged the belief among a large number of Indian
intellectuals and public men that there already exists a sufficiently strong basis for the secular state,
and there is no special need to promote secular values in society.

The evidence of history does not support the view that secularism as embodied in the Indian
constitution is derived from ancient Indian traditions, or that there Is a pre-existing place for
secularism in the Indian system of values. It is no doubt true that the state in ancient India was
often tolerant of all  religions, but the promotion of dharma was regarded as the foremost
responsbility of the state.

Moreover, the system of justice in ancient India was founded on the principle of inequality.
Special treatment meted out to religious minorities was dictated by considerations of commercial
interests and political expediency, not a conscious acceptance of the principle that adherents of
all religions were equal in the eyes of the state. In fact, religious minorities were protected and
granted special rights but the rights enjoyed by them were not on a par with the majority of the
population.

I emphasise the uniqueness and radical nature of the decision by Indian leaders to make India a
secular state for two main reasons. First, it serves to high light the fact that there was no basis for
secularism in ancient and medieval India. Second, it suggests that promotion of secularism called
for unusual energy and efforts. It was required that certain tendencies which had dominated social
and political life for centuries and had become particularly pronounced in the second half of the
nineteenth century should be consciously and systematically curtailed and discouraged. In the
course of our discussion I shall try to pinpoint some of these tendencies in somewhat greater detail.

In the historic past, Indians had not been seized with that spirit of nationalism which so radically
changed the face of Europe in the nineteenth century. The principal reason for this was that the
concept of nationalism itself was lacking in Indian thought. Bipin Chandra Pal echoed the feeling
after a lifetime spent in politics: "Our language has, in fact no word corresponding to the English
word 'nation' ...And the reason is that our social synthesis stopped with the race idea. We never
had, therefore, this nationalist sentiment before."

This traditional absence of patriotism or national feeling had important consequences for future
political developments. When the nationalist sentiments began to germinate in the minds of
Indian leaders in the latter half of the nineteenth century, these were driven to develop the
nationalist doctrine from scratch, so to speak, since Indian history could not provide any adequate
framework upon which a theory of nationalism could be erected. The concept of nationalism was
therefore improvised with the assimilation of certain deities from the Hindu pantheon. symbolised
by thefigures of Hindu goddesses Durga, Vani and Lakshmi, India was deified as the Mother to
whom her children owed the highest loyalty.

Such a view of nationalism could hardly be expected to appeal to the Muslim mind. The Muslims
were adherents of a different religio-centric manner of life and they did not share the Hindu
veneration of the country as Mother. It is true that the Muslim community in India was formed
gradually through absorption from Hinduism over the centuries, yet the two communities remained
distinct with an emphasis on their separateness.

There is no doubt that Hindus and Muslims shared, and still share, many common cultural values
and practices and that they were often bound together in close social and economic relationships.
Cultural habits die hard. But it is not necessary that these common special practices should have
made for a lasting homogeneity between the two communities.

As Louis Dumont has rightly suggested, the significance of the difference between Hindus and
Muslims is generally missed because religion is not taken as constitutive of society. Moreover,
a clear distinction is also not drawn between the various levels at which the religious conflict
between Hindus and Muslims found its expression.

For a proper understanding of the differences between Hindus and Muslims, it is necessary to
draw a distinction between the ideological and interactional levels and to consider the religion
of the masses separately from that of the educated Hindus and Muslims. Ideologically, Hinduism
and Islam are quite antithetical to each other. It is true that Islam in India adopted many elements
which were quite foreign to it. On the one hand, the Muslims tolerated the infidels alive as a part
of the socio-political system which they established in India, abolishing, from Akbar to Aurangzeb,
the capitation (jizya) tax on them. On the other hand, the Hindus accepted as rulers people who
could be transformed into Kshatriyas as they denied the supremacy of the Brahmins and
theoretically at least, the validity of caste distinctions. But this co-existence produced nogeneral
ideological synthesis. Islam refused to be completely fused into Hinduism, although it adopted
several elements from it.  Hinduism ossified itself in self-difference; the Hindu social system put
itself on the defensive after the Muslim conquest and tightened itself more than ever before.
Although there were movements and individual efforts at harmony, synthesis and even
composite development, the two religions remained widely separated.

SANSKRITISATION
The links were perhaps strongest at the base of the social system and the two communities
touched one another in positive ways. Edward C Dimock, Jr. has shown, using literary
evidence from the Muslim Vaishnava poets of Bengal, that Hindus and Muslims shared
pastoral and other festivals, and the similarities of devotional sufi doctrines to those of Hindu
bhakti made it but a short step from one religion to another. On the other hand, the educated
or otherwise culturally sophisticated members of the two communities recognised differences
between themselves and operated in different social orbits. For instance, the middle-class
Hindu, especially of the twice-born status, was never quite comfortable with his Muslim
neighbours whom he regarded as rude in their manners and unclean In their customs. The
Muslim on II his side did not forget that he had conquered India, and he was apt to
assert an importance which only irritated and annoyed. the Hindus. He was also
unable conceal his contempt for the Hindu as an idolator.

It needs to be emphasised here that the distinction between those who accepted the
absolute requirements of the faith and those whose behaviour was guided by the custom
of the village rather than by the precise prescriptions of Islamic law was not absolute.

An individual whose religious belief was compounded of elements of animism and magic
and mysticism as well as the teaching of the Prophet could be, and frequentlywas,
transformed into a relatively orthodox Muslim. It is essential to appreciate this dynamic
character of the categories, since because of it people who merely shared common cultural
elements  were unable to develop any special sense" of identity. It tended to encourage the
development of a consciousness of community, although the conflict of interest among the
social strata with in the community was often acute and occasionally came to the surface.
Whenever conflict arose between the communities, it tended to be posed in terms other than
of cultural similarity and to run along  the cleavage which was most sharply o defined in the
social structure, namely, religion.

Certain cultural processes tended to sharpen the differences between the two
communities and to contribute to the b development of community feeling among them.
For want of better words I use the terms 'Sanskritisation' and 'Islamisition' to refer to the
processes operating among Hindus and Muslims respectively.Sanskritisation refers to a
process by which the customs, rituals, beliefs, ideology  and the pantheon of orthodox
Hinduism spread to low Hindu castes and outlying groups.

The parallel process among the Muslims was Islamisation. It involves the spread  of the
customs, ideology and practices of the orthodox Muslims belonging to the upper strata of
the Muslim society. When a Hindu group was converted to Islam, it was immediately pushed
out by the Hindu social system. It no doubt continued to perform certain socio-economic
functions for the Hindu castes but the degree of its contact was restricted, especially so far
as commensality was concerned. Moreover, the convert group realised that Its status within
the Muslim community depended upon its distance from Hindu castes. As a result, it soon
discarded the un-Islamic practices which formed part of its general life-style, adopted a
new name designed to cannote a better social status, and advance a claim to have
descended from one of the nobleborn (ashraf)  families of Arabic or Persian origins.

It may be objected that I am advocating what is commonly known as the 'two-nation theory'.
There is no doubt that lasting heterogeneity between Hindus and Muslims was emphasised
as one of the cardinal points of that theory.  Its proponent, the geneity between the two
communities as a sole representative of the Muslims and to support its demand for a separate
homeland for Muslims.

Most historical studies in Pakistan insist that the creation of Pakistan was a logical
development of Indian history, since Muslims remained a separate nation despite the efforts
toward cultural synthesis between Islam and Hinduism.

This trend in Pakistani historical writings has its counterpart in India. The principal concern
of many Indian historians seems to be to counteract the Muslims League's two-nation theory
and to provide a historical basis for modern India's choice of secularism as a goal of national
policy. One consequence of this tendency among Indian historians has been that the
viewpoint holding that Indian culture is composite in character has come to be regarded
as the only truly nationalist point of view. Anyone who stresses the lasting heterogeneity
betweenHindus and Muslims is usually branded as a communalist and a supporter of the
Muslim League's two-nation theory.

The standpoint taken here is that the case of arguing that Hindus and Muslims remained
separate despite mutual interaction is historically sound. It is undoubtedly true that Indian
culture has imbibed a number of different cultural streams over the centuries. From time
immemorial India has attracted peoples of different cultures, religions and races and the
interaction among them, whether military or peaceful, helped to create a culture which would
have to be regarded as syncretic. However, the dominant strain of this culture was always
Hinduism, and, to the extent that Indian civilisation remained an amorphous entity, other
cultural streams were only partially integrated into the national culture.

It should be recognised that religious differences between Hindus and Muslims did not
make Pakistan inevitable. On the contrary, it was the subsequent development of Indian
politics which made the idea of Pakistan emotionally appealing to the Muslims. The Muslims
were slow to respond to Western education and there was far less intellectual ferment among
them. When they did take to Western education nearly fifty years later, they found that the
whole idea of nationalism , was deeply embedded in orthodox Hinduism. As with the Hindus,
therefore, their nationalism took the form of Muslim nationalism, looking back to Islamic
traditions and culture, and fearful of losing those because of the reassertion of orthodox
Hinduism.

Some secular-minded leaders in the Congress were disturbed by the development
of two parallel nationalisms in india and they tried to broaden the concept of Indian
nationalism to include both Hindus and Muslims. In a series of writings beginning with the
"Glimpses of World History," Jawaharlal Nehru tried to show that the Hindu-Muslim schism
in Indian life was a superficial phenomenon. India, he postulated, was a unity in which
people of different races, cultures and religious outlooks had intermingled to constitute a
composite national culture. As Michael Brecher has noted: "Nehru was not alone in
this view, but his influence gave it special weight in the party".

The impact of the secular leadership of the Congress was confined to th intellectual level,
however. On the popular level the leadership of the Congress after the death of Tilak upto
the time of Partition remained in the hands of Gandhi. Gandhi's religious background was
the popular Vaishnava tradition which provided him with an intimate knowledge of the
legends and symbolisms of the religious folk heroes India. Until his advent on the political
scene, the natIonal movement as represented by the Congress was restricted to the
Western-educated elite who had no mass base. Gandhi was quick to realise that a political
movement could not succeed without mass support, and he directed his energies to carrying
the political movement to the masses.

It is difficult to say whether Gandhi wanted to appeal to the masses of all religious
persuasions or, first and fore most, to the Hindu peasantry and, only secondarily, the
non-Hindu communities. It can be shown, however, that I Gandhi took the Indian masses
into groups and tried to enlist their support for the national movement separately, making an
appeal to each group on an issue which was likely to have some emotional appeal for it, and
at a time which appeared suitable for his purpose. He made a directly emotional and religious
appeal to the Hindu masses from the beginning, and, when the occasion presented itself,
tried to enlist the support of the Muslim on the Khilafat issue. In any case, to carry the
political movement to the countryside, Gandhi expressed himself a Hindu idiom. The prevailing
public attitude toward Gandhi is one of reverence. This mitigates a critical assessment of his
political strategy the place of religion in his political philosophy. Louis Dumont has suggested
that Gandhi's objective was two-fold: to attain independence and to consolidate Hinduism.
In order to attain both ends was necessary to show the beginning to reform. But reform was
subordinate to Independence.

Gandhi's approach to politics brought him In direct conflict with the secular leaders in the
Congress. These leaders were vexed by the increasing part played by religion in organised
politics. Men like Nehru and Bose found Gandhi's political tactics somewhat ideologically
frustrating, though they were unable to make a clear break with him for reasons
of political expediency. (Bose,of course, parted company with Gandhi subsequently.)

This created a duality of character in the Congress organisation. On the level of principles,
it claimed to be a truly secular organisation, refusing to take into consideration the rellglous
differences found in Indian society and presenting itself as a representative of the nation.
On the level of fact, on the other hand, it tended, or at least appeared to , the Muslims,
to be a predominantly Hindu organisation, identifying in the first place the Indian nation
with the high caste Hindu.

It is not my intention to suggest here that Gandhi was a communalist. In fact, his religious
faith was different from that of the earlier extremists like Tilak, and while his approach to
politics was basically traditionalistic, he broadened the nationalism of the Congress to
include the Muslims.It is nevertheless evident that Gandhi's efforts to bring about
Hindu-Muslim unity made little sense to a majority of the Muslims. His use of the religious
terminology of Hinduism alienated the majority of Muslims. They felt that his primary
sympathies lay with the dominant majority community and were unwilling to accept his
leadership. They continued to rally under the banner of the Muslim league. It should,
however,be emphasised that the Muslim image of Gandhi underwent a radical change in
the mid-forties when the Mahatma travelled across the country protecting Muslims
against communal frenzy. But this change in the Muslim image was far too late: the
seed of communal discord had already grown into a large shady tree and was bearing
bitter fruit.

It is often difficult for politicians to control the forces which they themselves set in motion.
Gandhi had taken the Indian masses in groups and tried to incorporate them into the
national movement in their own right, hoping that they would be able to share power
together. On the other hand, the leadership of the Muslim League, not to speak of their
communal parties, failed to see how the inherently Hindu character of the Congress
organisation could make for a peaceful and. fair political coexistence.They exploited the
Muslim alienation which Gandhi's political tactics had accentuated, and used the combined
Muslim support for political bargaining. All this had already sharpened the Hindu-Muslim friction.
The partition of the Indian subcontinent and the large-scale movement of population across
the borders gave an impetus to the social animosities between the two communities. There
was mass killing on both sides and communal tensions mounted to a point which is rare,
though not unknown, in human history.

The creation of Pakistan brought the Indian Muslims face to face with a difficult problem.
When Pakistan came into existence, some of the ,areas where the movement for a 'separate
homeland for Muslims' was most popular remained in India. The Muslims living in those areas
naturally had to make a choice between staying on in India or migrating to the country they
had fought to establish.

There were many practical difficulties which stood in the way of a clear-cut choice.
Many of the Indian Muslims were in government or private jobs and leaving for Pakistan
could involve loss of the advantage of seniority, provident fund and pension. The main source
of income for the upper and upper-middle class Muslim in North India had been jagirdari and
zamindari if these Muslims left for Pakistan they were liable to lose their title to the land.
In this situation, the choice of a large number of Muslims was made on the basis of pragmatic
considerations.

In India, the Muslims were not faced with the same kind of threat to personal security and
material assets as were the Hindus and Sikhs in the Punjab, or, at least, not to the same
extent. In West Punjab, as Prakash Tandon's autobiography shows, the Hindus and Sikhs
wanted to stay on, but it was the political situation which forced them to flee. In India, on the
other hand, the presence of a secular leadership, more significantly Nehru, gave the Muslims
assurance that their lives and personal property could be protected. The Muslims living in areas
which were not directly affected by communal riots largely stayed on even though many of them
were involved with the idea of Pakistan. It may be mentioned that the decision of a large number
of Muslims to continue to stay in India after partition   was reinforced by a vague idea which many
of them entertained at the time, namely, that India and Pakistan shall not remain separate
states for a long time; they will rather form a confederation in which the interest of the community
shall be safeguarded but there will be free movement of individuals from one part of the country
to another.

The continued presence of the Muslims in India was, however, a source of irritation for the
majority of Hindus. Hindu antagonism and hatred towards the Muslims who stayed in India
were so strong within the first few months of Partition that one would not have been surprised
if India has emerged as a Hindu state. It is well known that certain elements within the
Congress were favourable to the idea of India becoming a theocracy. However, there were
other factors which were not quite favourable to such a development. For one thing, the
leadership of the Congress and the country had passed, by this time, into the hands of
leaders who were intellectually and emotionally committed to the idea of secularism.
Second, India's declaration of becoming a theocracy would have seriously damaged the
image of the Congress. Third, the assasination of Gandhi created a favourable climate for
the acceptance of the concept of a secular state. Finally, the attainment of Independence
infused the Hindus with a novel sense of power and, in the wave of liberalism which often
comes with the acquisition of such power, they committed themselves to the idea of a
secular state as a concession to the Muslims. Many orthodox Hindus entertained the belief
after Independence that in accepting secularism they were making a gesture of goodwill
towards Muslims for, as masters of India's destiny, they could as well make it a theocratic
state. All these factors were not equally significant but they all contributed to the emergence
of India as a secular state.

Jawaharlal Nehru was the most outstanding advocate of the secular state in India. For him,
secularism was an important element in his total social philosophy, not simply an empty
political slogan. It was Nehru's contention that communalism, a dismal aspect of Indian
political life on the whole, was mainly a reflection of its backward economic organisation
and stagnant social structure. Soon after Independence, Nehru initiated largescale
programmes of economic development and social i change and launched the country
on the road to modernisation.

However, Nehru's forward-looking programes were essentially the programmes of a
small minority. A second class of opinion, with its roots spreading through all the main
interest groups in the country, was the body of orthodox and tradi tionalist Hindu opinion.
Its extreme expression was in the Hindu Mahasabha,the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh
(RSS) and the Jana Sangh but it had the sympathy of a large majority of Congressmen.
This class of opinion was opposed to most of the programmes and policies advocated
by Nehru. It disliked the efforts to raise the untouchables, to treat the Muslims as equal
citizens in a predominantly Hindu India, and to extend the rights relating to inheritance
and divorce to women. In short, it disliked the whole concept of a secular state.

Soon after Independence the traditionalist opinion called for formal recognition of Hinduism
in the Indian Constitution and social directives of state policy. Sardar Patel vowed that he
would not rest until the Somnath temple, partially destroyed during the Muslim invasion in
the eleventh century, was reconstructed and restored to its old glory. Ramakrishna Dalmia
launched a nation-wide campaign for the inclusion of a clause forbidding cow slaughter,
K.M. Panikkar called for the revival of Sanskrit.

Of course, these revivalist demands were a natural outcome of the manner in which Indian
nationalism had developed and the ideology which had provided substance to it. With the
attainment of Independence, it was only natural that the demand should have been
made that the state get rid of the cultural vestiges of alien rule and set about restoring the
past greatness of traditional Indian culture.

                                                 HARE RAMA
                                                  RAMA RAMA
Nehru thus had to make important compromises with and concessions to orthodox
opinion. For instance, Nehru hoped to pass the Hindu Code Bill in a single session
of the Constituent Assembly. It took him nearly six years to pass the two important
measures giving Hindu women equal rights with men in inheritance, succession and
holding of property, establishing monogamy and providing for divorce. Moreover, the
measures were processed piecemeal rather than as a single comprehensive enactment.
There was a second limitation also. The Indian political leaders were divided into
wo major groups. The first contained the all-India politicians who had been mainly
interested in the theoretical side of nationalism before Independence. The other group
consisted of provincial leaders amongst whom commitment to the ideals of ,secularism
and socialism was considerably diffused, varying in its form, character and intensity.
Moreover, these provincial leaders retained their political influence through an articulation
various regional and local interests.  Sometimes these interests ran counter or the ideals
accepted at the all-India level.  Thus, we find that, whether on the question of equal
treatment of Muslims and other religious minorities, removal of untouchability or

                                                  HARE KRISHNA
                                                  KRISHNA KRISHNA

elimination of religious symbolism from the state, the provincial leaders often went their
own way.

Within the Congress the trend toward the consolidation of traditionalist forces is reflected
in the changing character of the leadership.  The leaders who earlier advocated secularism,
socialism and economic development have been either gradually pushed out of the
Congress ( or put in the background ) or have voluntarily left the organisation.  Their
place has been taken by the so-called political bosses who control the party machinery,
organise factional politics and engineer the elections through their links with the cadre at
the grassroots level.  These leaders do not share the conviction of the earlier leaders
nor are they afraid to lose anything if the programmes of secularisation, modernisation
and economic development are abandoned.  In fact, they have a vested interest in
maintaining the status quo for the success of the programmes of economic
development and social change may bring about significant changes in people's
attitudes and values and thereby undermine the real bases of their power
and influence.

LIVE LIKE ALI DIE LIKE HUSAIN

The consolidation of orthodox forces has been accompanied by an increase in the
spread and revival of traditional values, and a growing communal consciousness.

Srinivas rightly insists that the spread of traditional values, whether through films
or AII-India Radio or in popular books, brings about radical changes in the content of
traditional culture. Indeed. from an academic point of view, it is possible to see the
revival and revitalisation of traditional symbols and values in contemporary India as
an aspect of modernisation. However, for a variety of reasons we can still characterise
the spread of traditional values a reassertion of orthodox Hinduism. For one thing,
the content of Sanskritic values, symbols,and mythologies retains its religious
and moral character and does not undergo secularisation in the course of their
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                                            Say YAALI
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spread through mass media or school text books. For instance, "Ramayana" 'and
"Mahabharata" were seen as a source of Hindu religion, not as literary classics,
and there is no attempt to undeify their heroes, Ram and Krishna. In fact, any
attempt to undeify the characters of the epics is considered "futile these values are
frequently characterised as a part of the cultural heritage of all Indians, not only of the
adherents of Hinduism. Finally, and this is a significant consideration, the revival of
traditional culture is viewed by the majority of Hindus as symbol of Hindu resurgence
and dominance.

Paradoxically, while on the one hand the democratisation of the Indian social
system has revived the role of the traditional groupings based on caste, sectarian
and regional or linguistic identity, increased sanskritisation has brought about the
consolidation of the Hindus as a religious community on the other. Some people are often
inclined to believe that the two types of communal consciousness (those of the traditional
grouping and the religious community) are similar in character and tend to neutralise one
another. What is generally forgotten by the proponents of this view is that they are
situationally determined and operate at different levels of segmentation. Broadly speaking,
the identity of the traditional grouping based on caste or sect is effective only so long as the
conflict or competition is confined within the religious community. When, on the other hand,
competition involves two or more religious communities, the internal cleavages within each
community usually merge together to form the wider religious community and consequently
it is the religious identity that assumes greater prominence.

The two wars in which India became involved during the last decade contributed a
great deal to the intensification of communal consciousness and the consolidation of the
traditionalist forces in the country. On both occasions the upsurge of nationalism had
strong undertones of Hinduism. Particularly during the Indo-Pakistan war the whole concept
of patriotism was deeply embedded within Hinduism it speaks a great deal about the nature
of Indian society that during the final phase of the war the entire propaganda machinery of the
government of India had to be directed towards projecting an image of Indian Muslims as loyal
citizens and rescuing them from a possible onslaught of Hindu communal violence.

The process of adjustment to the post-Partition situation produced two different political
tendencies among Indian Muslims. Some Muslims isolated themselves from the mainstream
of national political life and turned to the world of religious pre occupations. They were
encouraged in this by some Muslim religious or semi-political organisations, such as the
All-India Tablighi Jamaat and the All-India Jamaat-i-Islami, which had come into existence
shortly before Partition and whose members had offered support for the creation of Pakistan.

The Tablighi Jamaat put its emphasis on strengthening the observance of religion among
Muslims as it believed that the decline of the Muslim community in India was a result of its
having lost touch with the cardinal principles of the faith. It sent out deputations of missionaries
from place to place to sustain and strengthen the believers in the practice of their religion.
The Jamaat-i-Islami, on the other hand, believed that a true Muslim society could exist only in a
country where the government was in the hands of the Muslims and it was carried out
according to Islamic principles. It advised the Muslims that India was a dar-ul-harb and
the Muslims should refrain from taking part in its political structure until political power was
restored to the Muslims.

For obvious reasons, the movement repre- sented by the Jamaat-i-Islami could not
be very popular. It's theory that it was possible in India to have a Muslim majority and to
establish an Islamic state was quite fantastic. In India, where the Muslims constituted
hardly more than ten percent of the total population, there was obviously no scope for the
development of an Islamic state. But its political and social separatism with its roots
extending to the movement for religious puritanism which had been influencing Muslim
thought since Sheikh Waliullah attracted many people.

The majority of Indian Muslims were quick to see that too effective a participation in the
political process would arouse the hostility of the Hindus and withdrawal from it would
reinforce their charge that the Muslims were keeping themselves aloof from the
mainstream of national  life. So, led by Muslim leaders in the Congress and the
All-India Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Hind which alone among the Muslim organisations had
some influence in the community after Partition, the Indian Muslims extended
their political support to the Congress Party. Between 1952 and 1962 the Muslims
usually stood behind the Congress, supporting the candidates put up by the Congress
and electing Muslim candidates largely on Congress party tickets. Among the Muslims
elected to the Lok Sabha and the State Legislatures, those belonging to the Congress
constituted the vast majority in the first three elections.

It would be a mistake to assume that the Muslim support for the Congress was based on
a conscious realisat that political integration was the most desirable course open to the
community from the viewpoint of the future development of Indian polity. It was based on
pragmatic considerations: the community saw in the Congress a political umbrella which
could offer it protection agains Hindu communal forces and safeguard it political interests.

In the elections, Muslim candidates were often granted nominations to run for elective
offices. It is true that such nominations were generally motivated by considerations of
electoral strategy; they nevertheless increased Muslim representation in elected bodies.
Indeed, the number of Muslims elected to the Lok-Sabha during the first two elections
was in excess of their proportion in the total population in the country. However, this
enlargement of political representation produced little change in the mood of the
community.

The sense of frustration arose from two main reasons. First, the great majority Muslims
believed themselves to be discriminated against, especially from an economic point-of-view.
The All-India Muslim Convention held at Aligarh in 1953 expressed grave concern at and
dissatisfaction with the Central Government's policies towards their community. More
recently, Ansar Harvani claimed that, "After two decades of Independence, the Muslims
hardly find any place in the economic structure of the Indian society. They have almost
no place either in the corporate or public sector, and feel that they are being reduced to be
the hewers of wood and drawers of water."

It is difficult to ascertain with any degree of certainty whether in fact there is any discrimination
against Muslims in the matter of jobs, or it is merely a fiction of their mind, a reflection of
their fear of persecution in a predominantly Hindu India that they are subject to continuous
economic discrimination. Nevertheless, in a society where communal consciousness is
sharply developed and the outlook of the people is clouded by communal world-view, it
would be wrong  to assume that communal biases do not enter in recruitment at least at
certain levels of Government and private jobs.

But of course the important thing is not that there is discrimination against Muslims in the
economic structure. What important is that Muslims have felt so insecure as to believe
themselves to be the target of continuous economic discrimination. The fact of their belief
has been crucial in their social adjustment in the country.

The second reason which contributed to the sense of insecurity and apprehension in the
minds of the Indian Muslims was a belief that the Hindu majority was trying to break down
their cultural identity and to deprive them of their religious and cultural symbols. It is
sufficient here to state that the spread of Sanskritic cultural values and symbols through
school text-books and mass media, the attempt to project these values as the values
of all Indians, the repeated utterances of some traditionalist leaders suggesting that
Muslims must accept Hindu values and discard Arabic and Persian names in order to
become acceptable in the Indian state of the future, the diffusion of non-Islamic elements
in some of the Muslim institutions, such as the Aligarh Muslim University, which they
regard as symbols of their cultural heritage in India (especially since diffusion of non-Hindu
elements in Hindu institutions has been seriously resisted), the threat of reform of
Muslim Personal law and the decline of their language are some of the factors
that have contributed to their sense of insecurity and to their belief that their cultural
heritage is threatened by the resurgence of Hindu culture. All these factors are not equally
relevant. Nor are the Muslims justified in feeling threatened by all of them.

But the fear of submergence arising from the treatment meted out to Urdu or the spread
of Sanskritic symbols would not be altogether imaginary. Urdu has been eliminated from
schools throughout vast areas of northern and central India. Indeed, as W.C. Smith wrote
in 1953, the conclusion is inescapable that "The (Indian Muslim) commu~ity is in danger
of being deprived of its language, than which only religious faith is a deeper possession.
Nine years of gradual adjustment in other fields have brought no improvement in this, and
little prospect of improvement".

It is a matter of common knowledge that when a religious minority feels seriously threatened,
the machinery of its faith begins to wear out and its traditions begin to falter against those
of the majority, it turns worriedly in,upon i tsel f and i ts members cling even '; more intensely
to the faltering traditions. That something likc this has happened in ii the case of the Indian
Muslim seems qui te r.i; certain. Studies of religious change in , some parts of the country
where Muslims are found in substantial numbers show that the social and political
developments in the country have precipitated a renewal of interest in religion among the
Muslims and given rise to revival movements.

These changes are not confirmed to the rural areas. My research among Muslims in ,
Ut tar Pradesh shows that similar changes * are taking place in the urban areas also. ~
In all large towns and ci ties in the State r; the number of tradi tional Muslim schools !.:
has increased over the last two decades (even though the population of Muslims was
somewhat reduced after Partition) and there is a tendency among the Muslims to
send their children to these schools. Moreover, Muslim festivals and ceremonies
are celebrated with greater pomp and show.

Meanwhile, the death of Nehru whom the Muslims had considered a shield and pro- tector
and the erosion of the Congress umbrella has encouraged a tendency towards political
consolidation among them. The most direct evidence of this is to be found in the emergence
of the All-India Muslim Majlis-e-Mushawara.t as a fairly influential political force in North India.
It shows that Muslims are trying to con- solidate themselves in Indian political life so as to be
able to influence the political process directly.

Whether consolidation on the basis of religious identity is likely to prove detrimental to the
secularisation of Indian society is a debatable question and cannot be discussed here.
Beteille has recently argued that: "The growth of 'communal consciousness' need not be
viewed as necessarily an unhealthy or disruptive force. It may, on the contrary, be a
precondition for the integration of a minority group into the wider body politic.  For the
measure of integration lies not so much in the passive acceptance of the status-quo
as in the adoption of a body of common political rules through which divergent interests are
organised and articulated.  Thus what has been viewed by some as an increase in communal
consciousness may be only a step forward in the politicisation of Indian society".

However, the revival of traditional Islamic culture and the political consolidation of the Indian
Muslim community has been seen by many as an expression of Muslim separatism and
militancy.

Separatist or militant politics requires a special legal framework for its operation.
It generally operates in a political framework wherein two or more parties can vie with one
another for political favours from a superior arbiter.  Until Independence, the presence of the
British created a political system in which both Hindus and Muslims sought to appropriate
as many advantages for themselves as they could bargain for.  However, since Independence
the political balance of power has undergone a significant change, and the politico-legal system
does not provide an operative framework for separatist or militant politics: there is no superior
arbiter and the Muslims in the country have had to reconcile themselves to the fact that they
could no longer assert themselves without the risk of arousing the hostility of the majority
community.

This is not to suggest that Muslims are free from blame for the heightened communal feelings
and tensions in India today.  It is necessary to realise, nevertheless, that Muslim communalism
does not any longer enjoy a favourable legal framework for its operation, and has consequently
been rendered ineffective, although it has not died out any more than Hindu communalism.

Moreover, Muslims are not the only group which has consolidated itself in order to influence
the political process. Even a casual look at the political developments which have been
taking place over the last two decades will show that political consolidation has taken place
at almost all levels of Indian society, and social groups based on different kinds of communal
loyalties have tried to use their combined strength to influence the political process. Political
scientists have commented on the democratic reincarnation of caste for a long time. In addition,
regional and linguistic groups all over India have been consolidating themselves during the last
decade to count for more in political life.

In a way the process of cultural and political consolidation among the Indian Muslims is a
reversal of an earlier trend toward the integration of the community into the national body politic.
That the reversal has been influenced by the consolidation of the traditionalist and communalist
forces within the Hindu community 15 almost certain. In any multi-ethnic society the 'burden of
promoting the secularisation of the political system rests largely, though not exclusively, within
the dominant majority community, because it alone 15 in a position to take a comprehensive
view of the social and political process and to create a favourable atmosphere for the promotion
of secular values. Indeed, the actions and attitudes of the Hindus are of crucial importance at
present, because Muslim attitudes are still reactions to the pattern of Hindu politics rather than
independent initiatives.

In India, the state is committed to the ideology of secularism. The Indian constitution
guarantees equality of opportunity to everyone without the distinctions of race, religion and
creed. Moreover, religious or other kinds of minorities have been provided. with special
safeguards to protect their interests. It is now increasingly becoming obvious, however,
that these constitutional guarantees and protective measures have not worked well
in practice because those responsible for controlling the machinery of the state have often
allowed their attitudes and values to influence the administrative and political process.

It is obvious that a distinction can be meaningfully drawn between secular society and
secular state. Society is wider than the state in its operation. In a society where the outlook
of the people is dominated by communalism the state usually cannot function for along
time on secular lines because the prevailing social tendencies, sooner or later, find their
expression in the policies of the state. On the other hand, when a society is organised on
secular principles or respect for secularism as a social ideology is diffused throughout the
society, the state is generally likely to function on secular lines.

In India the state has remained committed to secularism but the widely diffused communalism
and the highly-strung atmosphere of the country has made it impossible for the secular
values and ideals to be realised. The champions of the ideology of secularism were conscious
that the constitutional declaration of India as a secular state was not likely to be particularly
meaningful unless the basic orientations of society were radically altered.

In recent years, unfortunately, the programmes which could help create a secular society
have been gradually discarded or slowed down. It has been commonly assumed that so long
as the constitutional provisions are not altered there is no cause to worry. In my opinion the
only guarantee for the constitutional provisions to be translated in practice is that a
consolidated and continuous effort should be undertaken to create a society in which mutual
respect and freedom of opportunity can be given actual shape. And it is to the task of creating
such a society that the political leadership should address itself in the future.