RAPE: FEAR IS NOT CONSENT
 
  It is extremely difficult to prove that a woman has been sexually exploited against her consent. But a recent judgement has shown a  ray of hope to the women. Read on…

  For years it used to be believed that as long as a woman had not been forced against her will to have sex, her consent was a given   thing. Under this definition, women’s rights activists and victims alike struggled hard and in vain to prove that rape had occurred. The   victim had to go through a lot of demeaning cross-examination and medical check-ups to prove that her complaint was genuine.

  Submission out of fear was not regarded in the victim’s favour. It was presumed that if the victim had not made her resistance   evident in a very clear manner, it could not be taken cognizance of.

  Now a landmark judgement made by the Supreme Court, the highest law of the land, has made the struggle less arduous for rape   victims. As long as it can be established that the rape victim succumbed to the perpetrator’s advances on account of fear, her case   need not fear dismissal.

  In a significant judgement, the court has widened the definition of rape. Under the new definition, any consent to sex made under   fear of terror cannot be construed as real consent.

  In this particular case, 17-year-old Mango Ram had been accused of raping his sister’s 13-year-old daughter. The sessions court   had acquitted him, saying the "evidence as a whole indicated that there was consent on the part of the victim to have the sexual   act."

  The Himachal Pradesh high court had also acquitted Mango Ram on the ground that the victim had consented to suffering the crime   committed by Mango Ram. It did not interfere with the lower court’s verdict, holding that it was "neither perverse nor grossly wrong."   However, the Supreme Court held the view that "Whether there was consent or not is to be ascertained only on a careful study  of all relevant circumstances."

  A bench comprising Chief Justice A S Anand, Justice R C Lahoti and Justice K G Balakrishnan explained that "consent for the   purpose of Section 375 of the IPC required voluntary participation not only after the exercise of intelligence based on the knowledge   of the significance and moral quality of the act, but after having fully exercised the choice between resistance and assent."

  The Supreme Court’s verdict stated that, as a whole, the evidence indicated that there was resistance to the sexual act. But the   apex court noted that the evidence as a whole indicated that there was resistance by the victim to the sexual act. "From the   evidence on record, it cannot be said that the prosecutrix (the victim) had given consent," the court noted.

  Women’s rights activists have welcomed the judgement for the far-reaching repercussions it brings in its wake. It is indeed  commendable when the law uses its jurisdictional powers to such positive effect. The implementation of such laws should help to  make the task of knocking on the doors of the courtroom easier for women.

      Cynthia Rodrigues
http://www.womenexcel.com/law/rape.htm